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This article examines the selection of decisionmaking procedures by
regulatory agencies, using the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and
its implementation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act ("RCRA")1
as our source of data. It seeks to refine recent work that has explicated the role
that congressional selection of agency procedures plays in the efforts of Congress
to control agency policy.2
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1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
2. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987) [hereinafter McNollgast, Administrative
Procedures]. Although BlueBook style calls for the use of "et aL" when more than two authors are
listed, we have listed all three authors' names here because of the peculiar nature of their writings. The
three authors listed often publish jointly under the pseudonym "McNolgast." Thus, all references to
McNollgast also represent McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast. Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll &
Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the
Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REv. 431 (1989) [hereinafter McNollgast, Structure and Process];
Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705 (1992); see also Murray J. Horn & Kenneth A.
Shepsle, Commentary on "Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies":
Administrative Process and Organizational Form as Legislative Responses to Agency Costs, 75 VA. L.
REv. 499 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative
Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93 (1992); Murray J. Horn, The Political Economy of Public
Administration (1988) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University).
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
What unites this effort with that of McNollgast and others is its treatment of
procedure as endogenous to the policy process itself Viewing procedure this
way implies that the issue of what procedural instruments policy actors choose
to employ cannot be satisfactorily analyzed solely as an autonomous issue, for
example, by reference simply to such relatively policy-neutral ideas as due
process. The McNollgast literature has concentrated on congressional choices of
procedures, exploring how Congress selects among procedural instruments in
order to advance its policy objectives.
In particular, procedural instruments constitute one means by which Congress
seeks to increase agency fidelity to the policy preferences of members of
Congress. In other words, Congress seeks to reduce slack in agency
decisionmaking that the agency can then exploit to pursue its own objectives.
In general, Congress accomplishes this goal through procedures that produce
political operating conditions for the agency that mirror the political environment
in the Congress that produced the law, that stack the deck in favor of the
enacting coalition, and that embody autopilot features enabling and motivating
the agency to change policies as the policy preferences of the enacting coalition
change.3
These and other investigations of Congress's capacity to exercise ex ante
control over agency policy through devices other than the substantive instructions
of the statutes themselves have contributed enormously to a more realistic
understanding of the Congress-agency relationship. However, it is by no means
clear how successful these ex ante controls are. Even after Congress has dictated
certain procedures, agencies retain considerable discretion to make selections
among procedural options-a degree of discretion that has been insufficiently
appreciated in the developing literature on endogenous procedural selection by
Congress.4 This article explores the endogeneity of procedure from the agency's
perspective.
B. The Congress-Agency Relationship
In this section, we locate our study of the Congress-agency relationship within
a larger context of public law scholarship. The relationship between Congress
and agencies has been a major concern since the advent of the New Deal and
has been the subject of work undertaken by economists and economically
minded political scientists, where that relationship has become a significant part
of the development of Positive Political Theory ("PPT").
These studies provide increasingly sophisticated treatments of the principal-
agent problem posed by congressional delegation of rulemaking responsibilities
to administrative agencies. The literature can be summarized as an alternating
3. McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 2.
4. But see John A. Ferejohn, The Structure of Agency Decision Processes, in CONGRESS:
STRucruRE AND POLICY (Mathew D. McCubbins ed., 1987); Terry M. Moe, An Assessment of the
Positive Theory of "Congressional Dominance," 12 LEGAL STUD. Q. 475 (1987).
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series of hypotheses and counter-hypotheses: first, one suggesting that Congress
controls, or dominates, agency decisionmaking, then a correcting or qualifying
hypothesis showing that congressional domination is significantly incomplete.
Each time a "congressional dominance" theory is advanced, a further look at
actual agency and congressional practices stresses that significant slack still
remains in the relationship, leaving the agency with considerable freedom to
choose action neither dictated nor desired by the Congress. This slack produces
an "agency discretion" hypothesis that emphasizes the agency's ability to deviate
from congressional dictates or desires.
Early on, congressional dominance theory rested on the conviction that
Congress established substantive policy with sufficient precision so that
administering agencies were left only with the tasks of completing necessary
details or applying general pronouncements to specific situations via noncontro-
versial methods of application.5 This hypothesis-that agencies were little more
than transmission belts between Congress and the regulated public--collapsed
in the face of general statutory delegations, such as the one empowering the FCC
to approve broadcast licenses in accordance with its understanding of the "public
interest, convenience and necessity." In that and other cases, Congress did not
expressly resolve all policy issues before it enacted a statute; often it left that
task to the agency. Thus, within broad limits, agencies appeared to be free to
do largely as they chose.
The next congressional dominance hypothesis contended that such broad
public interest delegations did not actually grant agencies the unfettered
discretion that might at first be supposed. Instead, agencies were constrained by
the need to apply some neutral methodology for determining what the public
interest required, whether the methodology was the economist's search for
efficient regulatory solutions to problems of market failure or some other set of
professional norms, such as those of medicine or engineering.
6
In its time, this hypothesis was questioned by a series of studies of actual
bureaucratic performance that demonstrated that agency decisions could not
routinely be squared with such methodologies, either because those methodolo-
gies were themselves indeterminate or because bureaucratic decisions were
inconsistent with the actions suggested by them.7 Once again, agencies appeared
largely unconstrained and free to pursue their own policy preferences.
Skepticism that a noncontroversial public interest theory of agency action
could be found produced a body of scholarship advancing various models of
agency discretion. Most notable among these were models of agency capture,
which asserted that agencies were highly prone to control by regulated sectors
5. See Cynthia Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State,
89 COLuM. L. REv. 452 (1989); Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law,
88 HARv. L. REv. 1669 (1975).
6. Stewart, supra note 5.
7. Id.
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of the economy.' In this view, giving agencies discretion resulted in regulatory
policy systematically favoring concentrated interests over dispersed consumer and
citizen interests.
Whether or not capture theory was embraced, however, the consensus in
public law scholarship throughout the 1970s and into the early 1980s was that
Congress had largely abandoned efforts to control agency outcomes. Proceeding
from that premise, scholarship developed in several directions. Some scholars
sought explanations for why congressional majorities would consign important
social and economic interests to an agency-administered policy lottery by delving
into the electoral advantages of such behavior.9 Others examined positive and
normative theories of judicial response, including a revived nondelegation
doctrine' ° and an "interest-representation" model of administrative law, in
which agencies were treated as miniature congresses, hearing from competing
interests before reaching a decision." Still others studied whether or not
presidential controls on agency action might provide the link between the
popular will and the agency thought essential to legitimate an agency's exercise
of power within a democratic polity.12
At this time of competing theories, the development of a new congressional
dominance hypothesis proceeded along two paths. First, scholars noted that the
alleged tendency of Congress to avoid making policy choices was not uniform.
In fact, in recent decades, Congress has written increasingly detailed statutes in
a number of controversial fields, most notably those affecting health, safety, and
the environment. Second, analysts came to recognize that writing substantively
detailed statutes was not the only way Congress attempted to maintain control
over agency actions. Even when statutory mandates were exceedingly general,
committee oversight and investigations, coupled with threats of drafting new
legislation, provided leverage over agencies to which bureau chiefs seemed to be
responsive. Such ex post supervision of agency behavior resembles the
monitoring behavior of principals that is one of the standard responses to the
problem of slack in private principal-agent relationships. In these two ways, new
congressional dominance hypotheses emerged in studies of the Congress-agency
relationship. 3
These newer hypotheses of congressional dominance had to take into account
the unique obstacles that monitoring faces in the political setting that are not
present in the private environment. Unlike private principals, majorities that
enact laws are coalitions, composed of individual members with distinct and
8. John S. Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L. REv. 713 (1986).
9. Peter H. Aranson et al., A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L. REv. 1 (1982).
10. See id.
11. Stewart, supra note 5.
12. Jerry Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 5 J.L. ECON.
& ORG. 81 (1985).
13. See, e.g., Moe, supra note 4; Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or
Congressional Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON.
765 (1983).
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potentially divergent interests. If an agency implements a policy other than that
desired by the enacting coalition, it may be impossible for the coalition to restore
its preference, because the agency policy may be preferred by a new coalition
resistant to the restoration. This problem of bureaucratic drift is not due to the
costs of monitoring; it can arise even when Congress has perfect information
about subsequent agency decisions.14
A second difficulty arises because of the president's veto power: if deviations
from congressionally preferred policy are preferred by a president prepared to
veto attempts at correction, the changes can be impossible to correct even if the
majority coalition stays intact. In such cases, a two-thirds coalition in both
houses of Congress is required to make the change. In these two ways, freedom
from congressional domination reemerged in our understanding of the Congress-
agency relationship, this time as a result of constitutional rules structuring the
formal relationships between Congress, the president, and the agency.
In the most recent stage in the study of the Congress-agency relationship,
some congressional dominance scholars acknowledge these theoretical reasons
for slack in the relationship but continue to question "whether and to what
extent ... shirking occur[s] in reality. Theoretically, there are several reasons
to believe that agencies do not stray far from the range of policies acceptable to
the supporting political coalition of the statutory policy."15 Prominent among
those reasons has been the thesis that Congress selects agency procedures and
other structures of decisionmaking as ex ante devices to control agency
policymaking.16
Our inquiry can be considered an agency discretion counterpoint to the
McNollgast congressional dominance hypothesis. We argue that agencies retain
considerable freedom to select procedures under which to operate, in ways that
can defeat ex ante attempts at control. This freedom enables agencies
themselves to treat procedure strategically as one endogenous component of the
overall process of formulating substantive policy. To explore agency selection
of procedural instruments in operation, we study how the EPA utilizes available
slack in the procedural selection process under RCRA.
14. See McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 2.
15. Roger Noll, Economic Perspectives on the Politics of Regulation, 2 HANDBOOK INDUS. ORG.
1253-87 (1989).
16. A number of different bills have been studied to document the claim that "legislators see the
choice of administrative structures and processes as important in assuring that agencies produce policy
outcomes that legislators deem satisfactory," and that they view procedure as "one means of guiding
agencies to make decisions that are consistent with the preferences of the [winning] coalition . . ., but
without requiring the members of that coalition to monitor, or even be aware of, the nature of the
agency's actions." McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 2, at 432. These include the Clean Air
Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401, 7403, 7405, 7426 (1988), the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988), the Consumer Product Safety Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2057 (1988), and the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. 4332 (1988). In each case,
procedural requirements for agency action can be seen as promoting interests of the enacting coalition,
including the president, by embodying "an ex ante agreement among legislators and the President that
limits the ability of each to engage in ex post opportunistic behavior." McNollgast, Structure and Process,
supra note 2, at 432.
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C. Binding Agencies with Procedural Constraints
Procedural constraints on agency decisionmaking have been thought to be
remedies to the problem of agency noncompliance with substantive policy
choices, and to be an improvement on reliance on ex post monitoring alone. For
example, McNollgast writes that "the potential for agency deviations from
intended policies that are difficult for politicians to punish or correct leads them
to devise institutions that limit an agency's ability to deviate."17 The literature
on procedural constraints has failed, however, to explain why we should not
expect the same tendency to deviate to arise when agencies are faced with
procedural instructions as we do when they are faced with substantive directives.
Why, in other words, do procedural instructions bind more effectively than policy
instructions?
One possible, but ultimately unpersuasive, explanation is that agencies view
procedural rules as occupying a policy sphere that is independent from
substantive policy, and thus somewhat less susceptible to agency manipulation
than substantive instructions. This argument reflects a "legal idealist" conception
of procedure that treats procedure as relatively policy-neutral, with decisions
about what procedures to follow being made relatively independently of the
substantive policy the procedures implement. Legal idealism may still be the
dominant view of procedures among lawyers and legal academics generally. 8
It is true that one way of controlling agency shirking is to delegate tasks to
professionals who will be constrained by their own professional norms. 9 The
legal idealist argument for the efficacy of procedural constraints rests, however,
on the assumption that agency lawyers are as subject to legal idealism as the
profession as a whole, and this assumption is questionable. A central insight of
the McNollgast literature is that legislators are aware of the policy relevance of
procedural choices and use procedure to advance policy objectives. Agency
personnel are at least as attuned to the dispositions and beliefs of legislators,
whose actions so profoundly influence their agency's options, as they are to their
own professional norms. There is no compelling reason to believe that even
agency lawyers would be unaware of the endogeneity of procedure.
Furthermore, legal idealist norms are quite weak in informing many of the
most significant procedural choices faced by administrative agencies, so that even
if legal idealist influence was actually quite compelling among agency lawyers,
that influence would not extend to the relevant agency decisions. Provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), 2 the necessity of producing an
adequate administrative record for purposes of judicial review, and general due
17. McNollgast, Structure and Process, supra note 2, at 431, 443.
18. Jerry L. Mashaw, Improving the Environment of Agency Rulemaking: An Essay on
Management, Games, and Accountability, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 185 (Spring 1994).
19. D. RODERICK KIEWIET & MATrHEW D. MCCUBBINS, THE LOGIC OF DELEGATION (1991);
Moe, supra note 4.
20. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1988).
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process considerations have all been invoked from time to time in judicial
decisions to justify imposing specific procedural requirements on agencies,
ostensibly on policy-neutral, idealist grounds. This body of case law, however,
addresses procedural details within basic procedural instruments such as notice-
and-comment rulemaking or adjudication. There is very little developed and
authoritative doctrine concerning the prior choice by the agency of which
procedural instrument to employ in the first place-whether to proceed by rule
or by adjudication, for example, or by guidance document or notice-and-
comment rulemaking. Accordingly, few legal idealist norms exist to guide the
agency's choice among procedural instruments, and, as we show in the case of
RCRA below, agencies retain considerable discretion to choose among those
instruments on policy-relevant grounds."
A second explanation for the greater effectiveness of procedural constraints
might rest on the possibility that ex post means for monitoring procedural
compliance are more effective than they are for monitoring substantive
compliance, so that agency fidelity to congressional procedural preferences is
more likely. Indeed, congressional committees do hold oversight hearings that
delve into the procedures through which agencies have reached decisions. Most
notable in recent years have been hearings into the roles of the Office of
Management and Budget ("OMB") and of the Competitiveness Council in
influencing agency outcomes. Again, however, there is no reason to suppose that
monitoring of procedure is any more effective than ex post monitoring of
substantive policy-and it was in response to the perceived inadequacies of the
latter type of ex post monitoring that procedural constraints were hypothesized
as a corrective. 22
21. Many of these decisions were rendered during the development of "hard look" review in the
1970s. For a review of the prominent cases, see WALTER GELLHORN ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
CASES AND MATERIALS 475-86 (8th ed. 1987). Much of the judicial development of procedural
requirements beyond the APA itself was halted by the Supreme Court's decision Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978). See infra text accompanying notes 23-25.
22. "Fire alarm" monitoring by interest groups that supported the successful enacting coalition is
a second monitoring device. In the McNollgast analysis, procedural constraints on agency action reduce
agency shirking in part by providing early access to agency deliberations for private interest groups. This
enables those groups to sound a fire alarm if the agency deviates from their own interests, possibly
triggering oversight activity by the congressional coalition that enacted the legislation. McNollgast,
Administrative Procedure, supra note 2, at 259-60.
Fire alarm monitoring can lead to agency changes in procedural mechanisms. In 1989, the EPA
proposed to revise the criteria for determining a "wetlands" for purposes of Clean Water Act jurisdiction
and its requirement that private parties obtain a § 404 permit before dredging or filling a wetlands. The
revision took the form of updating a technical manual written by the EPA to assist its field offices and
those of the Army Corps of Engineers in making such determinations, and was initially done without
public participation. Announcement of the EPA's intentions prompted considerable public outcry from
property owners and, in response to this outcry and to expressions of congressional concerns that the
revisions lacked adequate input from affected parties, the EPA pulled back on its plans in order to
initiate a round of public hearings across the country.
Sounding the fire alarm on procedure can be effective in this way. However, the relevant question
is whether there is reason to believe it to be more effective in monitoring procedure than in monitoring
substance, where it is also conceded to be occasionally effective, but not enough to satisfy the Congress,
which has developed procedural constraints to increase agency responsiveness to congressional
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Finally, it might be that the courts can be relied upon to enforce the
institutional and procedural structure selected by the Congress. Insofar as the
procedural structure has been precisely defined by Congress, courts do appear
to perform this function. Just as Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc.,' indicates that courts ought to enforce substantive congressional policy
choices where those have been unequivocally made, they should, and do, enforce
specific congressional procedural choices where those have been clearly made.
One aspect of our thesis, however, is that there is considerably more room for
agency selection of procedures than has yet been thoroughly explored in the
literature. This contention raises a question with respect to the courts, namely
whether they are employing procedural rulings for substantive policy-based
reasons. In other words, do the courts, as well as the legislature and the agency,
treat procedure as endogenous?
The policy basis for significant procedural rulings in the 1960s and 1970s has
been well recognized in the legal literature.24 It is generally argued that the
Vermont Yankee decision' terminated or radically diminished such policy-based
judicial impositions on agencies. At most, however, Vermont Yankee prohibits
federal courts from imposing additional procedural requirements beyond those
announced by Congress, whether through the generally applicable APA or the
agency's enabling legislation. We have already suggested that a major source of
agency flexibility comes not in the addition or subtraction of procedural details
to a structure ordained by Congress, but rather from the initial selection among
procedural structures or instruments themselves. If that is so, this re-opens the
possibility of courts encroaching on such agency flexibility for policy-based
reasoning in ways not clearly prohibited by Vermont Yankee. We are not
prepared to undertake an examination of this possibility at this time, but we do
note it as an object worthy of future study.26
The hypothesis that procedures constrain bureaucratic policy drift relies upon
the premise that such drift can be kept within tolerable bounds. In this section,
we have raised some theoretical reasons to doubt whether Congress can easily
control procedural drift to a significantly greater extent than it can policy drift.
In the next section, a closer examination of how agencies perform their policy
roles reveals that there are, in fact, several important stages in the making and
implementing of agency rules that provide the opportunity for such drift.
preferences. And once again, we can think of few reasons to suppose that the answer to this question
is affirmative.
23. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
24. Stewart, supra note 5.
25. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S.
519 (1978).
26. For applications of the methods of positive political theory to courts, see William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 523 (1992); Rafael Gely & Pablo T.
Spiller, A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State
Farm and Grove City Cases, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 263 (1990); Pablo T. Spiller & Matthew L. Spitzer,
Judicial Choice of Legal Doctrines, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 8 (1992).
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D. The Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
1. Opportunities for Agency Discretion in Translating Congressional Policy into
Influences on Private Behavior. In 1976, Congress enacted RCRA, establishing
the basic regulatory structure still in place today.27 Congress has, however,
subsequently revised RCRA in several ways significant to the present study.
Among other things, RCRA empowers the EPA to issue standards for
generators and transporters of hazardous wastes and for operators of treatment,
storage, and disposal ("TSD") facilities, and it establishes a permit system to
enforce these standards. We use the EPA's implementation of RCRA's
permitting system as a laboratory to study the role of procedure in constraining
agency action, and also to study the continuing ability of the agency to exercise
its own discretion in choosing implementation procedures. RCRA presents a
particularly interesting study for our thesis-that agencies retain considerable
discretion to choose among procedural options-because the statute is often cited
as an instance of Congress manifesting its policy preferences in considerable
detail through both substantive language and procedural constraint.
Procedural and structural directions written into statutes such as RCRA
perform two major functions for Congress: (1) through disclosure and
participation requirements, they enable the constituencies who supported the
legislation to monitor agency behavior and to signal Congress as problems arise,
and (2) through analytical, factual, and participatory requirements, they give
leverage to those same constituencies in the agency decisionmaking process,
thereby creating institutional conditions that channel the agency toward policies
compatible with the enacting coalition's preferences, even if those preferences
were not precisely known at the time of enactment. We refer to these two
functions as the monitoring and channeling functions, respectively. To assess the
efficacy of procedural constraints in performing these functions, we need to
examine the actual workings of agency rulemaking in some further detail.
First, procedures cannot channel if the agency does not use them. Inaction
has always been a significant tool in agency efforts to defect from congressional
policy direction. The literature expanding on the McNollgast thesis frequently
assumes that the agency will activate whatever procedural mechanism Congress
has codified, but this is by no means necessarily so.
Congressional coalitions interested in agency action have been aware of this
problem for some time, and over the past two decades have developed a number
of action-forcing instruments. These include writing statutes in terms of
nondiscretionary duties, drafting deadlines by which time the agency must have
acted, and employing statutory "hammers," which place certain regulatory
consequences immediately into effect unless the agency has written a rule or
taken some other specific action by a certain deadline. Nondiscretionary duties
27. ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET. AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION, LAW, SCIENCE AND POLICY
214-26 (1992).
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and deadlines, however, have had only limited effectiveness, while hammers have
limited utility, insofar as they require Congress to write specific substantive
provisions, which is the very task that delegation to an agency is intended to
obviate.'
Second, even when the agency determines to act, it retains more discretion
than might be expected. Translating a statute like RCRA into tangible policy
that influences private behavior entails three distinct stages. At each stage, the
agency has considerable discretion to make choices that result in deviation from
congressional policy.
The first stage is rule enunciation. Here the agency interprets and amplifies
a statutory provision to articulate a regulatory rule. Paradignatically, this occurs
through some kind of agency rulemaking proceeding, involving one or more
public notices of the proposed rule, a comment period, perhaps a revision of the
proposal followed by more comment, intensive and extensive review and analysis
inside and outside of the agency, and eventually the publication of the rule in the
Federal Register.
The precise rulemaking procedures are subject to individualized specification
by Congress, and it is in these specifications that McNollgast sees opportunities
for Congress to empower private interests to monitor agency action, and also to
mirror the political environment and stack the procedural deck by, for instance,
requiring rules to meet the substantial evidence standard of judicial review rather
than the arbitrary and capricious standard, or by requiring the agency to resolve
technical issues where expertise and knowledge reside disproportionately under
the control of one party or another.
In the McNollgast story, agencies enunciate rules by deploying the statutorily
crafted procedures. In reality, however, agencies have more options. For one,
they can deploy the statute's procedures to enunciate a rule that is, in important
respects, still incomplete. For example, RCRA contained an April 1978 deadline
for the promulgation of Subtitle C (hazardous waste disposal) regulations. The
rule the EPA eventually issued exempted several significant categories of waste
disposal, including burning of hazardous waste for energy recovery, on the
ground that the EPA had insufficient information to issue rules. As another
example, the EPA's RCRA rules quite often leave open complete technical
specification of topics like engineering standards for groundwater monitoring, or
the security requirements for post-closure care of a TSD facility. Subsequently,
these can be filled in through intra-agency memoranda, guidance manuals, policy
statements, or references to third-party documents-none of which are typically
issued via the statutory procedures for rulemaking. Opting for these procedures
means opting for procedural structures in which the monitoring and channeling
functions Congress has built into the statute are not operative.
28. For a review of the use of these devices, see Sidney A. Shapiro & Robert L. Glicksman,
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Quiet Revolution in Administrative Law, 1988 DUKE, L.J. 819.
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Regardless of what procedures the agency chooses to use to enunciate a rule,
significant additional steps in the policy implementation process remain to be
completed, each presenting new opportunities for strategic agency behavior. The
second stage is rule application. RCRA requires that rules for TSD facilities be
translated into a permit for each regulated facility. Under the RCRA system
of federal-state sharing of authority, these permits are often largely written by
state agencies, although EPA regional offices retain responsibility for writing
certain provisions established by the 1984 Hazardous and Solid Waste Amend-
ments Act (the "HSWA") until states obtain approval to do so. Wherever the
permits are written, the system of permit writing provides opportunity for
individualized negotiation of at least some permit terms. Once again, the
statutory procedures for monitoring and channeling of the rule enunciation phase
do not generally apply to this stage of the implementation process.
In the third and final stage, the agency engages in rule enforcement-where,
once again, significant opportunities for discretionary decisionmaking exist. If
an objectionable pattern of rule enforcement becomes sufficiently noticeable,
private interests can sound the alarm, as occurred in the case of both Superfund
and RCRA in the early 1980s.29 In the case of RCRA, industrial interests have
from time to time been among those urging a more consistent enforcement
policy because, as Chemical Week once noted, "[in a highly competitive industry,
companies cannot afford to spend their resources on environmental protection,
however well conceived the rules, unless they perceive those rules are backed up
by a credible enforcement policy."'  Much more often, however, it has been
extremely difficult to monitor patterns of rule enforcement. This difficulty is
exacerbated by the decentralized nature of many enforcement decisions. More
to the point of the McNollgast analysis, enforcement procedures are almost never
directly addressed in statute drafting.
At each of these stages, the agency can make decisions outside the
procedural constraints the statute establishes for rule enunciation itself, and
decisions at each of these stages can deflect final agency policy away from the
desires of the enacting coalition. Decisions may be made under conditions that
may or may not mirror the political environment that surrounded the enacting
Congress, and those conditions may or may not stack the deck in the direction
of the successful coalition. Monitoring will be more or less effective depending
upon those conditions.
Drawing an accurate picture of the significance of agency selection of
procedure, then, entails an examination of agency behavior at each of these
stages in the translation of congressional policy into influences on private
behavior, and drawing such a picture is itself a necessary prelude to understand-
ing the true significance of congressional selection of procedural instruments.
29. See infra text accompanying ntoes 40-43.
30. We Need a Credible EPA, 129 CHEMICAL WK. 33, Oct. 21, 1981, at 3.
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In emphasizing the retention of procedural discretion by the agency, we
remain in agreement with the general thrust of the McNollgast insight: Congress
does select among procedural devices in order to facilitate monitoring and
channeling of agency action. We want to emphasize that agencies may continue
to possess considerable procedural discretion even after Congress has selected
procedures with their policy significance in mind. The second part of this article
examines that discretion in the case of the EPA's implementation of RCRA.
First, in the concluding part of this section we provide the story of RCRA's
evolution in Congress in McNollgast terms.
2. RCRA and the Congress. RCRA was enacted at the end of the 94th
Congress, in 1976.31 It was the last significant federal pollution control statute
passed in the 1970s. At the time, the Toxic Substances Control Act
("TSCA"),32 which drew considerably more public and interest group attention,
was also being debated in Congress. RCRA was the less publicized and
contested of the two bills, but the same political forces were at play in its
development as in TSCA's drafting.33 Although the EPA had been established
in large part to keep environmental law implementation free from traditional
special interest group capture, environmental groups in the mid-1970s were
concerned that the EPA was acting too slowly in enunciating and enforcing rules
under the earlier laws. Pro-regulatory forces thus insisted on legislation with
provisions that compelled the EPA to act. Accordingly, RCRA contained a
number of statutory deadlines that gave environmental groups strong monitoring
and some channeling capabilities in the implementation process through their
ability to initiate deadline litigation should the agency fail to act.
However, by the mid-1970s, environmental fervor did not completely
dominate the policymaking process. As already suggested, President Ford was
not well-disposed toward creating more regulation, and the costs environmental
controls were imposing on the economy were receiving a great deal of attention.
RCRA also contained provisions that evidenced the significant influence existing
TSD facility operators had on the process, an influence that seems undeniable
in a bill that passed the Senate by voice vote and the House 367-8.' First,
implementation was to proceed under a procedure that granted existing facilities
31. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992 (1988).
32. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2671 (1988).
33. Note that TSCA comes easily into focus through a McNollgast lens. It was a statute that had
been debated for five years before passage, as the opposing forces around the bill had produced a
legislative stalemate. The bill contains potentially powerful regulatory tools, but they have never been
vigorously employed by the EPA, in large part because the statute is so procedurally complex. These
procedural sections were drafted strategically, so that once the substantive and procedural provisions are
read together, the net result is a bill that does not tilt strongly either in the direction of environmental
protection or in the direction of permissively sanctioning industrial manufacture of toxic substances.
Instead, it mirrors the closely divided political environment present when the statute was enacted, in
which environmental protection sentiment was substantially offset by the opposition to new regulations
on business of President Ford and his supporters in the Congress. RAY M. DRULY & GIRARD L.
ORDWAY, THE ToxIc SUBSTANCES CONTROL Act (1977).
34. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC: 94TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION 199 (1976).
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"interim status" to operate, provided only that they registered with the EPA.
Interim status meant that such facilities could continue their existing operations
unchanged until the EPA first wrote permitting requirements and then processed
their applications-a process that was to take more than ten years for a number
of facilities. Interim status removed any incentive waste disposal facilities users
and operators might have otherwise had to cooperate with the EPA to complete
the rule enunciation responsibilities under the 1976 Act.
Second, the EPA's need to write comprehensive rules for the entire waste
disposal industry gave powerful advantages to the industry, whose representatives
provided such a wealth of information about how the industry was multifaceted,
and regionally and technologically differentiated, that the EPA was nearly
paralyzed in the early rulemaking stages. Deadlines for rule enunciation came
and passed. In 1978, the Environmental Defense Fund and several other groups
filed suit to compel the EPA to issue the Subtitle C regulations necessary to
institute the nationwide permitting system.35 While the statutory deadline had
passed, the federal court did not have any practical tools available to compel
agency compliance. It could not simply write the regulations itself and order the
agency to issue them. Holding individual agency officials in contempt was a
theoretical possibility, but courts are extremely reluctant to resort to this drastic
measure, especially when the agency presents good faith reasons for the delay.36
Eventually, the parties and the court negotiated a rulemaking schedule. It, too,
was extended several times before a series of rules were issued in 1980 and early
1981 to establish the permitting program.37
At this point in the story, it seems very unlikely that the EPA's slow
implementation of RCRA deviated very substantially from the preferences of the
closely balanced enacting coalition. This assessment seems particularly accurate
in the case of the EPA's implementation of the hazardous waste provisions of
Subtitle C, provisions that have become the most controversial of the statute, but
which received very little attention. The bill's environmental proponents were
much more interested in stressing the recycling and reclamation features of the
bill, as reflected in the name of the act itself. The cradle-to-grave monitoring
system established by the law was understood by all as a significant legislative
measure, but there was no widespread rejection of landfills as a means of
disposing of hazardous wastes once minimum technological standards had been
met. Moreover, TSD facilities had not yet become a focal point for the not-in-
my-backyard phenomenon.
For his part, President Ford had in the mid-1970s resisted expensive changes
in both the Clean Air and Clean Water Acts," and did not agree to TSCA until
35. Illinois v. Gorsuch, 530 F. Supp. 340 (D.D.C. 1981).
36. The EPA had several good faith explanations for the delay. The task had proven much more
complex than the EPA had supposed-the deadlines were unrealistic. Congress had given the EPA
many, many environmental responsibilities in addition to RCRA implementation, and the EPA had
made a prioritizing judgment that other statutes demanded more attention.
37. See 42 FED. REG. 2802 (Jan. 12, 1981); 45 FED. REG. 76,630 (Nov. 19, 1980).
38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1988) ("CAA"), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988) ("CWA").
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it had been modified to reduce its compliance costs. Industry proponents in the
House and Senate thus had strong bargaining positions to resist costly hazardous
waste controls, even if environmentalists had been much more mobilized with
respect to RCRA than in fact they were. In sum, the EPA's relatively lax pace
of implementation and its direction of scarce agency resources to other programs
was tolerably close to the policy preferences of the 94th Congress. As of the
early 1980s, there was, apparently, not enough bureaucratic drift to take the
EPA's policy outside of the pareto triangle created by the preferences of the
House, the Senate, and the President.
Part of the McNollgast thesis is that the monitoring and channeling functions
of procedures operate to reduce the likelihood that agency implementation will
drift outside that triangle. Indeed, Shepsle has suggested that in the normal case,
agencies with ideal points lying outside the triangle will treat the triangle as a
constraint and will optimize by picking the nearest policy point on the triangle's
boundary-thus avoiding reversal by the coalition-and that the various
monitoring and channeling procedures built into statutes enable the Congress to
send effective signals to agencies that stray from the triangle.39
From time to time bureaucrats may conclude that their interests are served
by defying warning signals from Congress, perhaps because they are pursuing
agendas that place high value on the short-term gains of such actions, or perhaps
because they are supported by an ideological constituency that values that
gesture of defiance. The possibility of simple miscalculation cannot be ruled out,
either. Whatever the underlying causes, there is some reason to suppose that in
the early days of the Reagan Administration, the EPA's implementation of
RCRA (as well as Superfund) drifted outside the policy triangle and thus made
the statute vulnerable to amendment.
Less than two years into the Reagan Administration, the Assistant
Administrator in charge of RCRA and Superfund, Rita Lavelle, was accused of
political manipulation of the program, of making "sweetheart deals" with
contributors to the President's election committee, and of using contracts to
reward and punish legislators.' In addition, EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch
had expressly adopted a nonconfrontational implementation approach for all of
the EPA's programs, RCRA included-an approach that many felt translated
into woefully inadequate enforcement." To compound matters, Lavelle
continued to espouse the safety of landfilling hazardous materials even after the
EPA scientists had testified before Congress that virtually all landfills leak
eventually.42
39. Kenneth A. Shepsie, Bureaucratic Drift Coalitional Drift, and Time Consistency: A Comment
on Macey, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 111, 113-15 (1992).
40. House Subcommittees Begin Reviewing EPA Documents; Two More Officials Are Fired, CONG.
Q. WKLY., Feb. 26, 1983, at 412.
41. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC: 97TH CONGRESS, 2ND SESSION 453 (1982);
CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY ALMANAC: 98TH CONGRESS, 1ST SESSION 453 (1983).
42. Hazardous Waste: Lavelle Says Land Disposal Regulations 100 Percent Effective in Protecting
Public, 13 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1444-45 (Dec. 14, 1982).
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It is ultimately difficult to isolate the extent of bureaucratic drift, however,
because during this same period the preferences of majority coalitions in both
the House and the Senate were also changing. In both bodies, the median
legislator was adopting a dramatically more skeptical attitude toward landfilling
wastes than was reflected in the 1976 RCRA legislation, as well as a preference
for stiffer technology standards, and fewer loopholes than the 1976 law allowed.
These shifts had been propelled by commentary such as that of the EPA's
scientists.43 Even more significantly, incidents such as Love Canal, the Valley
of the Drums, and Tunes Beach had inflamed public sentiment about negligent
disposal practices and heightened the public's fear of exposure to toxic
substances. Laxness and loopholes in RCRA regulations were argued to be
contributing to the continuing creation of such sites, thus contributing to an
ongoing clean-up problem. In particular, public sentiment against land disposal
had shifted from the 1970s to the 1980s,4 such that RCRA's apparent neutrality
toward different disposal technologies was out of step with widespread public
sentiment.
As a cumulative result of bureaucratic and coalitional drift, by the early 1980s
the EPA's policies had come to be located well outside the preferences of the
present House and Senate, so much so that Congress was able to revisit RCRA.
Over President Reagan's initial resistance-a resistance that waned as the 1984
elections neared-Congress passed the HSWA, revamping both substantive
hazardous waste policies and the procedural constraints under which the EPA
implements them.
Figure 1 summarizes this legislative and agency history. The apexes of the
triangle closer to the origin represent the ideal points for President Ford (P) and
the House (H) and Senate (S) of the 94th Congress. The apexes of the triangle
farther from the origin represent the ideal points for President Reagan (P1) and
the House (H1) and Senate ($,) of the 98th Congress. President Reagan's ideal
point has moved less from his counterpart's than those of the two branches of
Congress, as indicated by his opposition to HSWA.
The initial agency implementation point, that is, the agency's chosen position,
A is depicted as within the policy triangle established by the 1976 legislative and
executive actors. By 1981, that point had drifted at the very least to the left
most boundary, and was likely to the left of the boundary (A'). Compounding
the friction between the EPA and Congress, the policy preferences of both
bodies had moved up and to the right during this same time period, as indicated
by the second triangle. As a result, HSWA become a viable legislative response,
and the agency was directed to adopt position A,.
If this account is sound, it provides some support for a suggestion first made
by Horn and Shepsle in their comment on a McNollgast article. 5 They
43. Id
44. RIcHARD C. FORTUNA & DAVID J. LENNETr, HAZARDOUS WASTE REGULATION: THE NEW
ERA 199 (1987).
45. See Horn & Shepsle, supra note 2.
Page 111: Spring 1994]
LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS
suggested that the enacting coalition faces a trade-off between controlling
bureaucratic drift and coalitional drift. Devices that provide the enacting
coalition's legislators easier influence over agency policy in order to protect
against bureaucratic drift also provide easier means for new legislative coalitions
to exert their influence, should there be a coalitional shift in the Congress. Thus,









Lax Regulatory Standards Tough
The RCRA experience seems to bear this out. Beginning in 1980, Congress
engaged in extensive and intensive ex post monitoring of the EPA's behavior,
holding numerous oversight hearings, commissioning and issuing critical studies,
and jawboning. These devices were largely ineffective; if anything, the EPA
policy under Administrator Gorsuch drifted further away from the policy
preferences of the legislative coalition during this period, members of which were
themselves shifting markedly away from those of the 1976 enacting coalition.
Whether advertently or not, the 1976 coalition had created conditions that
protected the EPA from a good deal of congressional influence, meaning that the
enacting coalition would have had a difficult time correcting for bureaucratic
drift, but also implying that the agency was relatively protected from the
demands for policy change created by coalitional drift.
As we have suggested already, in 1984 HSWA altered both the substance and
the procedural constraints applicable to the EPA's implementation of RCRA.
The new enacting coalition rewrote the substantive provisions of the law to
reflect its policy preferences for tougher standards, for fewer regulatory
loopholes, and for the use of landfilling only as a last resort. On the substantive
side, RCRA was at the time the most detailed and substantively specific statute
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Congress had ever enacted in the environmental field, although it has since lost
this mantle to the 1990 Clean Air Act Amendments.' Reacting to its recent
experiences of the EPA intransigence, Congress also imposed additional
procedural constraints as means of ex ante control against bureaucratic drift.
The act continued numerous additional deadlines, and statutory hammers
reduced the value of delay to the agency.
The RCRA/HSWA story affirms important aspects of the McNollgast
thesis.'47 In addition, it demonstrates Congress's ability to learn from experience
and to make adjustments to procedure on the basis of historical awareness of
how the EPA was able to deviate under previous procedural constraints.
The remainder of this article stresses an additional feature of the RCRAIHS-
WA story: notwithstanding congressional efforts to control agency policy drift
through increasingly detailed procedural constraints, the EPA has had, and
continues to have, considerable discretion to select, among a range of available
procedures, methods of implementing the hazardous waste program.
II
TEST DESIGN
Our tests combine theories from political science, economics, and law with
data from the EPA's hazardous waste program to investigate the degree to which
regulators are strategic in their choice of whether to issue rules formally or
informally. In the PPT literature originating with McNollgast, administrative
procedures serve as "instruments of political control" in the relationship between
Congress (multiple principals) and regulators (the agent). The substance of rules
issued by agencies is, in part, affected by the provisions for interest group
monitoring and input made possible by the notice-and-comment process of rule
promulgation in the Federal Register.' Congress is portrayed as influencing
regulatory outcomes by structuring the rulemaking process (for example, by
determining who has the burden of proof in the setting of a regulatory standard
in a particular program). This description of rulemaking, however, ignores the
possibility that regulators may also be strategic in their use of administrative
procedures. The crucial insight here is realizing that agencies may choose to
avoid the issuance of formal rules through the notice-and-comment process, and
instead produce "informal rules" through such devices as agency directives,
guidance documents, and policy memoranda. Even when Congress writes
specific constraints into the notice-and-comment rulemaking mechanism, it
seldom, if ever, completely forecloses the option of informality for the agency.
46. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7403-7651 (Supp. 1990).
47. Daniel Farber, Politics and Procedure in Environmental Law, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 59 (1992).
Its story also seems consistent, on the supply side, with the kind of account Farber has given of the
production of tough, as opposed to symbolic, environmental legislation.
48. For empirical tests of interest group influence on another EPA regulatory program, one dealing
with industrial effluent discharge standards, see WEsLEY A. MAGAT ET AL., RuLES IN THE MAKING
(1986).
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Here, we are using "formal" and "informal" in ways different from their
standard usage among students of administrative law. In administrative law,
formal rulemaking refers to agency procedures that closely resemble those of a
civil court of law, while informal rulemaking consists of more simplified
procedures that have come also to be called notice-and-comment rulemaking.
In our terminology, both these types of rulemaking are "formal." We reserve the
term "informal" rulemaking to describe those devices just mentioned through
which the agency issues policy statements or interpretations without engaging in
either formal rulemaking or notice-and-comment rulemaking.49
This section models the decisions of one set of regulators, EPA officials
responsible for issuing rules to implement RCRA, in the selection process they
face when choosing the format in which to issue a rule. Hypotheses about what
drives the decision of whether to issue a rule formally or informally are derived
from two disparate literatures, the "make-or-buy" economics literature in
industrial organization and the legal scholarship on the optimal precision of rules.
The economic literature on whether a firm makes a product internally or
buys it on the open market provides some explanatory power for regulators'
behavior; in issuing a rule an agency faces the decision of whether to "make" its
own rule through a policy memo or guidance document or to use the political
"market" to generate the rule through the formal notice-and-comment process.
Transaction costs economics predicts that whether a firm makes a product or
buys it on the market will in part depend on the transaction costs of managing
production and purchase relationships." Transaction costs may arise because
of bargaining problems and incomplete contracting. If specialized knowledge or
assets are developed, then this may give rise to the prospect of opportunism on
the part of the outside producer (for example, this producer may gain knowledge
through production, which cannot be replicated easily on the open market) or
on the part of the consumer (for example, if a producer invests in specialized
equipment that has a lower value to other customers, the customer may attempt
to renegotiate an agreement after the assets are sunk). A key point is that
incentives to live up to agreements depend in part on the existence of an outside
market that defines the opportunities available to buyers and sellers. Taking
production inside the firm involves its own costs, such as increases in monitoring
and administration.1
49. See generally Robert A. Anthony, "Well, You Want the Permit; Don't You?" Agency Efforts to
Make Nonlegislative Documents Bind the Public, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 31 (1992); Robert A. Anthony,
Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 1 (1990);
Michael Asimow, California Underground Regulations, 44 ADMIN. L. REV. 43 (1992).
50. RONALD COASE, THE FIRM, THE MARKET AND THE LAW (1988); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON,
THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1985); Paul L. Joskow, Contract Duration and
Relationship-Specific Investments: Empirical Evidence From Coal Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 168
(1987); Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting
Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297 (1978).
51. The variables that increase the costs of using the market to purchase a good often also increase
the costs of internal production. Hence arguments about the transaction costs of firm versus market
production are often about the relative increases in costs (for example, what happens to the value of
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A second source of hypotheses about agency rulemaking incentives is the
legal literature on the optimal precision of rules, especially Professor Diver's
framework for analyzing regulatory precision.52 Professor Diver defines three
measures of regulatory precision: transparency (does the rule have an accepted
meaning); accessibility (is the rule really applicable in the real world); and
congruence (does the rule achieve the desired results). In assessing the relative
costs and benefits of the degree of precision involved in the enunciation of a
rule, Diver says that one should take into account such variables as the rate of
compliance, the over- or under-inclusiveness of a rule, the costs of rulemaking
(including information gathering and securing agreement among participants),
and the costs of applying a rule (including costs of dispute resolution).
These theories about administrative procedures, firm versus market
production, and optimal precision of rules can be combined into a model in
which regulators face the decision of whether to produce a rule internally
through the issuance of a guidance document or policy memo, or to use the
"political marketplace" to produce a formal rule. We view the generation of an
informal rule by regulators as analogous to the decision by a firm to make a
product internally; whereas we view the notice-and-comment process of
publishing a formal rule in the Federal Register as using a political market in
which the rule that emerges is influenced by interactions among interest groups
that comment on the rule, congressional staff that monitor agency output,
executive branch members such as OMB staff that review proposed regulations,
and courts that appear likely to intervene. Just as characteristics of specific
products influence whether a firm will rely on the market or internal production,
"costs of market purchase-costs of internal production" when a given factor changes). Factors thought
to favor internal production over market purchase include transaction specificity (the more specialized
the product or capital involved, the more rents are created and hence the more the firm chooses to avoid
being at the mercy of outside providers), uncertainty and complexity (which make complete contracts
in market transactions harder to write), and similarity of transactions (if similar actions are already
performed in-house this makes internal production of a given good cheaper). The theory predicts that
a firm will take more precautions in choosing the governance relationship of a firm's internal hierarchy
or a market's contractual obligations as the complexity of the transaction increases, as the dollar value
of the transaction increases, and as the amount of price competition on the open market for the good
decreases.
Recent research in industrial organization has empirically examined the "make or buy" decision
by taking a sample of parts used in production in a given industry and testing whether one can predict
if the firm will have produced the part internally or purchased it in a market. Scott E. Masten, The
Organization of Production: Evidence from the Arrowspace Industry, 27 J.L & ECON. 403 (1992); Scott
E. Mastin et al., The Costs of Organization, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1 (1991); Kirk Monteverde & David
J. Teece, Supplier Switching Costs and Vertical Integration in the Automobile Industry, 13 BELL J. ECON.
206 (1982). Variables included in these empirical tests of firm decisions to produce or purchase include
survey estimates of engineering intensity involved in designing a part (with the hypothesis being that the
higher the technical skill required, the more likely production will take place inside the firm because of
specialized knowledge created), systems' effects and relatedness of parts (the firm will be more likely to
build a part internally if it is a component of a larger system built in-house), and design specificity and
complexity (the firm will be more likely to produce in-house if the part is to be used by one company
only). The framework for examining a sample of products can be extended to investigating a sample of
agency rules and determining what characteristics lead to the production of some rules "informally."
52. Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of Administrative Rules, 93 YALE LJ. 65 (1983).
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the characteristics of different types of rules will influence whether regulators will
behave strategically. Our specific hypotheses are:
1. As transaction costs of securing an agreement go up, an agency will be
more likely to use informal rulemaking. Though few regulations go through an
explicit negotiation process in their formulation, the ability of interest groups to
challenge rules in court and seek revisions through congressional action,
combined with the requirement that agencies respond to comments in their
formulation of final versions of formal rules, mean that the notice-and-comment
process can take on the trappings of a negotiation. As transaction costs to
striking a deal increase, regulators will be more likely to opt for informally
issuing the rule. The transaction costs of securing an agreement may rise with
increases in the complexity of a rule, the number of parties affected, the
heterogeneity of interests, and the degree of technical uncertainty associated with
a standard.53 As the political and regulatory costs for a rule increase, resistance
to agency action may increase, creating additional transaction costs in the formal
rule process. The agency's transaction costs in issuing formal rules include staff
time and resources expended in complying with the notice-and-comment process.
According to an optimistic timetable of goals for promulgating hazardous waste
regulations, developing and publishing a "high priority" rule may take at least
two years of planned internal work group meetings, agency and OMB review,
public comment, revision, and final publication."4 Hypotheses about transaction
costs relate to the agency's desire to conserve its resources in the development
of rules. The EPA's experimentation with regulatory negotiations that bring
interested parties together to produce a consensus that may form the basis of a
notice of proposed rulemaking demonstrates a desire to reduce agency
transaction costs.
2. As the political costs of adopting a given rule increase, an agency will be
more likely to use informal rulemaking. Rules that provoke interest group
responses that may lead to court challenges or congressional action to overturn
agency action are more likely to be issued informally in order to make such
politically costly reversals less probable. For a given rule, the political costs
perceived by the agency will also depend on the policy distance among the points
favored by regulators, courts, and members of Congress. The greater the
uncertainty associated with the political market, in terms of the ability to predict
the type of rule that will emerge from the formal publication process, the more
the agency may try to avoid the traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking path.
3. As the regulatory costs imposed on parties increase, the more likely the
parties will resist and, hence, the more likely the agency is to use informal
rulemaking. Industry interest groups may attempt to weaken costly formal rules
53. Kathleen Bawn, Political Control versus Expertise: Explaining Differences in Administrative
Arrangements (1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the authors).
54. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PROCEDURES FOR DEVELOPING REGULATIONS AND
GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, POLICY DIRECTIVE
#9435.00-1 (Office of Solid Waste, 1987).
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by commenting on them during the formal rulemaking process or by challenging
them in court. Similarly, environmentalists may attempt to strengthen provisions
through submissions and court challenges. Regulatory costs for industry include
expenditures arising from compliance and enforcement actions, while costs for
environmentalists may relate to the potential environmental damages posed by
the activity regulated. The more at stake for regulated parties and other
intervenors, the more likely the agency may be to issue the rule informally.
Issuing a costly rule through the informal process has several advantages for the
agency: it makes input from interest groups less likely than under the formal
process; reduces the ease with which Congress may monitor agency performance
and hence lessens the ability of interest groups to "pull the fire alarm" on agency
actions; lessens the probability that an interest group will be able to challenge the
rule in court as informal rules lack the long administrative records of formally
published rules; and enables the agency to alter costs of compliance for particular
parties since informal rules may be applied with more discretion than formal
rules.
4. As concern for uniformity, enforceability, the value of precedent, and the
advantages of avoiding individual adjudication increase, an agency is less likely to
use informal rulemaking. For some standards, the agency may choose formal
rules because their wider publication makes them easier to enforce, they promote
uniform standards by reducing discretion on the part of regulators in interpreting
and applying the regulations, and they establish predictable patterns of behavior
that the regulated party can look to in understanding its property rights under
a given regulatory regime. Where the agency values clarity and standardization,
such as in highly technical rules that the agency wishes to apply without variation
to a large number of facilities, formal rules may thus be favored. To the extent
that the application of an informal rule at a regulated facility may involve
negotiations that are similar to adjudication, regulators may prefer formal rules
because they avoid the costs of these individual negotiations.
5. As congressional specificity in a statute and willingness to monitor its
implementation increase, an agency may be more likely to use informal rulemaki-
ng. Though Congress delegates much discretion to agencies in formulating
regulatory standards, it sometimes signals concern with agency behavior through
provisions in legislation that set deadlines for the issuance of formal rules or
establish fallback regulatory positions ("hammer provisions") that take effect if
the agency fails to act. One reasonable inference might be that as Congress
signaled its interest in a particular set of rules, the agency would be more likely
to use formal rulemaking since its efforts were being observed. However, one
may also view informal rules as an avenue to expand on rules that are formally
issued. Hence, as congressional activity in monitoring a particular rule increases,
we hypothesize that this may lead regulators to be more likely to use informal
rulemaking to avoid the public, political marketplace battles that occur with the
notice-and-comment process. Even though a formal rule may be issued to
comply with the deadlines and hammer provisions established by Congress, the
agency may also issue informal rules that supplement or circumvent the formal
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rule. For example, the agency may issue informal rules in the form of directives
and guidance manuals that become the agency's de facto policy even as the
agency's official policy is being developed through the issuance of heavily
scrutinized notice-and-comment rules.
6. When courts are actively monitoring agency action, the regulators will use
informal rulemaking. In areas where the courts signal that they are monitoring
agency behavior by issuing deadlines for rule issuance or remanding an issue
back to the agency, regulators may be more likely to use informal rulemaking to
circumvent this monitoring. As in the case of congressional scrutiny, the agency
may respond to court scrutiny by issuing a formal rule. We believe, however,
that the additional scrutiny by courts will also lead the agency to issue informal
rules that deal with the area involved in litigation. An alternative hypothesis is
that in a post-Chevron world of court deference to agency action, regulators may
be more willing to use the formal process since their actions are then less subject
to challenge in the courts. Our hypothesis is that, on balance, court scrutiny will
lead to informality.
We have chosen to examine these six hypotheses about regulators' selection
of formal versus informal rules by examining the rules implementing RCRA"
The set of "informal" regulatory requirements associated with RCRA is
comprised of three separate types of "rules." The EPA's Office of Solid Waste
and Emergency Response ("OSWER") has issued a large series of directives that
help explain agency policies to regional offices, state environmental agencies
(who play a large role in hazardous waste regulation since parts of RCRA are
delegated to states for enforcement), and the public. The OSWER documents
range from short policy memos to guidance documents numbering hundreds of
pages. These documents have been compiled by the EPA so that interested
parties have a single, comprehensive source for the requirements under
RCRA.56 Many of the documents have been given wider circulation by the
EPA through their publication by the National Technical Information Service.
While the agency's output of OSWER directives began to drop off after 1988,
the Regulatory Development Branch (the "RDB") of OSWER continued to
provide regulatory interpretations about RCRA. The private consulting firm
McCoy Associates requested the memos, dubbed the "RDBs memos," under the
Freedom of Information Act and cross-referenced the approximately 1,700 pages
55. One reason the RCRA program was chosen is that since part of the regulatory activity centers
around the negotiation of permits for facilities that treat, store, or dispose of hazardous waste, there is
room for regulators to exercise discretion as to what is incorporated in the "regulatory contract" at each
facility. The necessity of having an operating permit to continue the operation of a hazardous waste
TSD facility and the prospect for future regulatory interactions in inspections and enforcement actions
may provide the EPA with the leverage to require firms to adhere to "rules" that have not been formally
promulgated but which the agency treats as its standards in permit negotiations and enforcement actions.
A second reason for selecting this set of regulations is that a private consulting firm has undertaken the
task of cataloguing the "informal rules associated with RCRA" and cross-referencing them with the Code
of Federal Regulations.
56. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, RCRA PERMIT POLICY COMPENDIUM UPDATE
PACKAGE (Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, 1992).
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it received in reply. Together with the OSWER directives, the firm estimates
that its RCRA index covers over 900 documents with nearly 19,000 pages of
requirements in the form of "letters, guidance manuals, and directives."'57 A
third source of information about the EPA's "informal rules" is the publication
by the EPA of its responses to questions about interpreting hazardous waste
regulations. The EPA RCRA/Superfund Hotline is set up to answer questions
from the regulated community about interpretations of hazardous waste laws and
regulations. The EPA circulates a monthly internal report on the Hotline which
includes questions and responses that provide clarifications of agency policy.
McCoy and Associates has collected these responses, published them, and cross-
referenced them with the Code of Federal Regulations (the "CFR") to provide
a third set of interpretations (over 260 separate Hotline responses) of the
agency's rules for generation or handling of hazardous waste.
One test to determine the degree of formality of rule selection would be to
examine the characteristics of each of the informal rules set forth in the EPA's
directives and the formal rules implementing RCRA contained in the CFR. We
have chosen the computationally simpler path, however, of using the cross-
referencing of these formal and informal rules to answer the following question:
what characteristics of the formal hazardous waste rules published in the CFR
predict whether there will be informal rules addressing the same regulatory
requirements as the formal rules? This inquiry ignores those informal rules not
cross-referenced with the CFR; it also assumes that the contents of the informal
rules are similar to their formal cross-referenced CFR counterparts. This
formulation has allowed us to structure a way to test many of the theories of
administrative procedures within this particular rulemaking program.
The unit of observation for our tests is the decimal point CFR number (for
example, 261.31 is treated as an individual rule, as is 261.32). This division yields
a total of 697 formal rules in the CFR sections implementing RCRA. We
created a coding sheet, which several law students used to classify the substance
of these rules according to the categories described below. After the contents
of the formal rules were coded, the data were merged with the list of informal
rules so that we were able to determine which formal CFR decimal point rules
had "informal" counterparts in OSWER directives, RDB memos, and Hotline
responses. Our main tests were logistic regressions which modeled the
characteristics of the formal CFR rules that influenced which rules had
"informal" rules that added further requirements. Since the majority of the
pages of requirements were contained in OSWER directives, the analysis focuses
on models of which types of rules were supplemented by informal rules
contained in OSWER directives.
Out of 697 formal RCRA rules analyzed, 210 had at least one OSWER
directive associated with their regulatory requirements. The dependent variable
57. McCoy AND ASSOCIATES, MCCOY'S INDEX OF RCRA REGULATORY INTERPRETATIONS i
(1992).
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in our logistic regression was equal to 1 if the formal CFR rule had at least one
OSWER directive associated with it and 0 if there were no OSWER directives
associated with it. The independent (that is, explanatory) variables were
designed to reflect the hypotheses about what types of rules were more likely to
be issued formally or informally by regulators.
Table 118 presents the list of variables and their definitions. Each decimal
point rule dealing with RCRA in the CFR was examined and analyzed according
to the following categories:
Rule requirements: Every rule was classified into at least one requirements
category depending on what the rule required the facility operator to do or
allowed the agency to do. Rules were thus classified depending on whether they
dealt with the provision of existing information, provision of new information,
testing or monitoring, expenditures on specific physical or human capital,
enforcement actions or inspections, financial requirements, closure or post-
closure issues, corrective actions (that is, cleanups), or definitions of the scope
or applicability of a rule. The expected signs for these variables will depend on
the interaction between transactions costs of securing agreement on the
requirement, the political costs associated with the requirement, the compliance
costs, and concerns about enforceability and the value of avoiding individual
negotiations and adjudications with the application of the rule at a facility.
Rules requiring the provision of existing information or requiring testing may
be issued through the CFR because they tend to have relatively low compliance
costs. Concern for enforceability if court disputes arise and a need to establish
wide understandings among the regulated community may make it more likely
for regulators to issue definitions and technical standards formally. Provisions
relating to enforcement actions by the agency, cleanup standards in the event of
contamination at the hazardous waste facility, and closure requirements may be
more likely to be supplemented by informal rules, because these rules are
politically controversial, entail large costs for the regulated community, and often
involve interactions between regulators and facility operators in which the agency
may wish to preserve discretion through the application of "informal" rules.
Specific technologies: If the rule focused primarily on provisions affecting a
specific technology for handling hazardous wastes, then the provision was
classified according to whether it dealt with the technology of container storage,
tanks, waste piles, surface impoundments, incinerators, landfills, land treatment,
or miscellaneous technologies such as drip pads. Hypothesized signs for these
technology dummy variables related to the number of facilities, amount of waste
handled, and controversy in terms of environmental hazards and compliance
costs associated with the waste handling method. The higher the number of
facilities using the technology, the more likely the agency would be to issue a
rule formally so that it did not have to engage in numerous negotiations about
the interpretations of informal rules at a large number of facilities when the rules
58. All tables referenced in this article can be found in the Appendix at 149-60.
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were applied.59 The same logic may apply to amounts of waste; if a technology
is widespread and the agency issues formal rules to avoid individual enforcement
negotiations with numerous facilities this may mean that larger amounts of waste
are covered by formal rules. The more controversial the technology in terms of
its perceived health effects, the more likely the agency is to avoid the formal
process and deal with the facilities through informal rules. The threats posed by
groundwater contamination from landfills and the debate over the risks
associated with incineration mean that the agency may be less likely to use the
"market process" of formal notice-and-comment rulemaking to set standards
relating to these technologies.
Related variables include what types of facilities are regulated by the rule.
Given the large number of generators, the agency will be likely to issue rules
covering these facilities formally to avoid numerous interpretations of rules; since
commercial facilities that process waste generated offsite are fewer in number,
the agency may be more likely to issue informal rules relating to these facilities.
Rule History: A separate set of hypotheses relates to the interactions among
Congress, the agency, and the courts. When the rules are enunciated in their
final form in the Federal Register, the EPA often recounts the history of the
rule's promulgation, including actions taken by Congress and the courts. We
have constructed dummy variables relating to the rule histories, which entail
several caveats. First, the rules announced often come in bundles (for example,
multiple CFR decimal point rules are announced together), so that it is difficult
to determine which rule among the several announced was the subject of the
congressional action. We adopted the coding convention that for a given set of
rules announced in a Federal Register listing, the legislative and judicial history
would be applied to the entire set of rules for that day. Second, we assume that
significant legislative and judicial actions have in fact been included in the
agency's introduction to the rulemaking. Third, a given rule may go through
multiple revisions during its lifetime. Our history variables are coded so that the
dummy variable equals 1 if the rule at some time meets the requirement of the
specific category (for example, if at least one version of the rule was subject to
a court deadline, then the dummy variable for court deadline is 1 for this rule).
Variables dealing with the level of congressional and judicial scrutiny include
whether Congress set a deadline with a fallback regulatory standard if the agency
did not act (a "hammer" provision), whether Congress set a deadline for rule
issuance but did not specify a default regulatory position, whether the courts
imposed a deadline for rule issuance, or whether the courts remanded a rule to
the agency or the version of the rule arose from court actions such as consent
decrees (these latter two actions will be collapsed into the term "court remands"
in our tables and discussion). The effect of these actions on the agency's
59. Note, however, that the large number of participants in the formal rulemaking process could
make securing agreement at the rulemaking (as opposed to rule application) phase more difficult if the
participants had numerous divergent interests.
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procedural decision in rulemaking is an open theoretical and empirical question.
Greater congressional and judicial scrutiny may make the agency more likely to
show deference to these institutions by issuing the rules formally through the
notice-and-comment process. If the agency wishes to circumvent the expressed
directions of Congress or the courts, however, regulators may be more likely to
issue informally when these groups have signaled interest in a particular set of
regulations, because informal rules may be less susceptible to reversal and less
likely to result in a reprimand for the agency.
Another part of the preamble and analysis of a formal rule described in the
Federal Register is an indication of whether the rule is a "major rule," a
designation that triggers a formal regulatory impact analysis and is generally
applied to rules with costs of over $100 million. Under the hypothesis that the
higher the cost of a given rule the more likely the agency will be to act
informally to avoid contention in the rulemaking process, we would expect to
find more informal rules associated with formal "major" rules. The total number
of versions the CFR rule has been through has also been calculated, on the
theory that the more controversy surrounding a rule (reflected in part by its
number of revisions), the more likely that the agency will supplement it with
informal rules. The number of technical corrections is also counted; though here,
under the theory that technical issues and definitions may be dealt with formally
to provide greater clarity in enunciation and application, the hypothesis is that
the greater the number of technical corrections to a rule the more likely it will
be that the rule will be issued in a formal version without informal supplement.
The action taken by the agency to amend the rule formally may also be an
indication that informal documents that would provide further elaboration of the
rule do not exist.
Table 2 summarizes the expected signs of these variables' coefficients in a
logistic regression examining whether a formal rule is supplemented by an
OSWER directive. A "+" indicates that for the given hypothesis the variable
will make it more likely that an informal rule supplements the formal CFR rule,
while a "-" indicates that the variable makes it less likely that the formal rule will
have an informal rule associated with it. In terms of regulatory costs, formal
rules with low expected costs (for example, those requiring existing information,
mandating testing, or providing definitions) would be less likely to have
associated informal rules, while those with high expected costs (for example,
those relating to new information, technical standards, enforcement, financial
matters, closure, or corrective actions) would be more likely to have associated
informal rules. High political and regulatory costs may make the transaction
costs of a formal rule in terms of agency time and resources so high that the
agency will be more likely to supplement or supplant the formal rule with
informal rules. Rules with high political costs include controversial measures
such as those relating to enforcement, closures, and corrective action; rules
relating to the specific technologies of incinerators (associated with technological
uncertainty and air pollution risks) and landfills (associated with groundwater
contamination) and certain types of facilities (for example, commercial facilities,
[Vol. 57: No. 2
STRATEGIC REGULATORS
whose disposal capacity may pose the threat of significant externalities); major
rules (which by definition impose large regulatory costs, and will also be
politically controversial); and heavily revised rules (whose revisions indicate
controversy).
In terms of the application and enforcement of rules, we hypothesize that the
agency will be more likely to issue only formal rules where there is a need for
wide and precise understandings, such as with rules relating to technical
standards or with technical requirements (as indicated by the number of technical
corrections) and rules relating to definitions. Where the agency may wish to
preserve its discretion, however, informal rules may be issued since they can be
more selectively applied. Concern for agency discretion may thus lead
requirements dealing with agency enforcement actions or facility closure to be
issued in part through informal rules. The higher the number of facilities affected
by a rule, the more costly the process of clarification and negotiation associated
with the application of informal rules. Hence, if a particular technology is used
at a large number of facilities, then the agency's concern about regulators'
implementation costs may make it more likely to issue requirements through
formal rules only.
Table 3 provides indications of the number of facilities associated with
different waste handling technologies and forms the basis of our hypotheses
about the relative advantages of rule formats in terms of application costs. Since
the technologies of containers and tanks are used in waste management methods
at thousands of sites, rules governing these technologies are likely to be formal.
Technologies used at fewer facilities, including incineration and landfill, will be
more likely to be covered by rules with informal elements since there are fewer
facilities to which the agency must apply these rules. Similarly, the large number
of generators means these facilities will likely be governed by more formal rules,
while commercial facilities (which are fewer in number) may be less likely to be
covered by formal rules alone.
Finally, both congressional and judicial scrutiny are assumed to give rise to
CFR rules that are associated with formal rules. While this scrutiny may mean
that the agency will issue formal rules that are examined by the courts and
Congress, we believe that the added monitoring may make it more likely for the
agency to issue additional requirements through OSWER directives and guidance
manuals.
While we have emphasized that the EPA may choose informal rules to avoid
the monitoring and reduced agency discretion associated with the procedures of
formal rulemaking, questions remain about whose influence the agency is trying
to avoid each time it issues an informal rule and to what end it is using an
informal process. Noll's external signal model' identifies numerous groups that
60. Roger G. Noll, Government Regulatory Behavior: A Multidisciplinary Survey and Synthesis, in
REGULATORY POLICY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 9 (Roger G. Noil ed., 1985).
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have an impact on agency decisionmaking: Congress, courts, executive branch
officials, industry participants, and environmentalists.61 Though our discussion
of informality will often proceed as if informal rules were used to evade these
parties, it should be noted that some participants may prefer the agency to issue
rules informally to avoid the influence these participants' opponents could
exercise in the formal process. For example, members of Congress concerned
about the possibility of the OMB delaying the promulgation of formal
regulations unless standards imposed on industry were eased might prefer the
EPA to issue its rules first through guidance documents and directives less
subject to OMB oversight. (By the OMB's own estimate, it caused the content
of nearly one-third of the rules proposed by the EPA in 1986 to be changed after
they were initially submitted for review. 62) To what end informality is used by
the agency also remains an open empirical question in our tests. The agency
may use a directive to expand coverage of a rule so that additional costs are
borne by industry, or it might narrow an interpretation so that environmental
risks are increased. The ultimate impact rule format selection has on environ-
mental outcomes thus remains open for debate.63
61. Id.
62. OMB Said to have Influenced One-third of Regulations Proposed by EPA in 1986, 17 ENV'T
REP. (BNA) No. 1616 (Jan. 23, 1987).
63. There are several objections and qualifications to the above theories, which we will address
before presenting the results of our tests. An alternative explanation for the series of guidance
documents and policy memos issued by OSWER is that they are simply interpretations of the CFR which
really exact no new regulatory burdens; according to this view, these documents are simply making
property rights clearer by elaborating on already established rules instead of creating new rules. Our
tests can explore this hypothesis, however, for it predicts that there should not be any systematic
differences between those formal rules that have informal counterparts and those that do not, except
perhaps in characteristics that might require further elaboration. A second possible objection is that
these documents should not be called rules because courts would not uphold them as formal
requirements for a facility seeking a RCRA permit since the rules had not gone through the notice-and-
comment process. We believe that an agency's leverage with hazardous waste facilities, which arises out
of the agency's permitting authority and the likelihood of future enforcement interactions between
regulators and facility operators, allows it to encourage compliance with its "informal rules" as part of
the set of rules governing EPA's expectation of how hazardous waste facilities should operate. The
regulatory checklist used by state permit writers negotiating RCRA permits for TSD facilities, for
example, includes provisions arising solely from agency guidance documents and not appearing in rules
formally promulgated in the CFR.
In developing our hypotheses, which focus on the external parties influencing agency
decisionmaking, we have neglected to describe problems facing agency officials relating to the internal
agency procedures to be chosen for rule formulation. As Ferejohn has observed, agency officials
concerned about decisionmaking delegated to subordinates will design internal review processes that
allow for "the collection of information about whether a proposal is likely to evoke controversy in the
agency's environment." Ferejohn, supra note 4, at 446. The choice between issuing a policy by a formal
rule or an informal directive may thus relate to the internal EPA procedures associated with the agency's
own review processes for these different types of rules. In a 1987 directive, OSWER outlines how the
internal review process of workgroup meetings, interoffice reviews, and senior official involvement will
vary for regulations and guidance documents depending on three factors: the scope and cost of the rule;
the environmental benefits associated with the requirement; and management concerns, which the
document defines in part by a series of questions ("Who are the interested parties, what political or
economic pressures are driving the development of the rule, and what are the potential impacts if the
Agency does not develop the rule now but chooses to defer or postpone development?"). OFFICE OF
SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, PROCEDURES
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RESULTS
Our analysis of the agency's rule enunciation selections under RCRA
provides an overview of the number of rules issued, a comparison of formal rules
with and without associated informal directives, a logistic analysis of the
determinants of rulemaking formality and of court remands, and an examination
of what drives the length of informal rules issued. The figures in Table 4
indicate that a large volume of informal rules exist that supplement the formal
RCRA regulations promulgated in the Federal Register and that the time pattern
of their release differs from that of formal rules. The unit of analysis in counting
formal rules was the decimal point rule in the CFR. Under this counting system,
697 new formal rules implementing RCRA were issued from 1980-91. The
average formal rule goes through at least two versions, so if one counts each
edition of a rule as a separate rule there were 1634 total final RCRA formal
rules published in the CFR by our counting system. The largest number of new
rules (153) was issued in 1980, and the smallest number (3) was issued in
controversy-racked 1984.
For the main source of informal rules under RCRA, the policy memos and
guidance documents issued by the EPA's OSWER, McCoy and Associates had
FOR DEVELOPING REGULATIONS AND GUIDANCE DOCUMENTS 14 (1987). The interested parties that
those drafting rules are to consider, according to the directive, reads like a who's who of the external
signals model: Congress, the OMB, state agencies, environmental groups, citizen groups, and industry
associations. The agency's internal process for reviewing rules thus depends in part on the likelihood
of external scrutiny, with the more attention attracted outside the agency the more internal review
processes envisioned by the OSWER directive on rule development. Our examination of what drives
the selection of formal versus informal rules focuses more on the "agency's" calculation of relations with
external participants than on how internal review processes differ for formal versus informal rules (which
would deal more with the relationships among offices and hierarchies within the agency).
A final note relates to how this test fits into the broader McNollgast view of administrative
procedures. Previous work has allowed Congress to be strategic both in terms of its policy positions and
in its use of administrative procedures, while regulators were treated as having policy preferences but
lacking strategic power to circumvent the instruments of political control established by administrative
procedures. In contrast, we treat regulator's strategic power as an open question, and we test the
hypothesis that regulators too are able to act strategically with regard to rulemaking procedures, by
choosing to avoid the formal rulemaking process and to issue informal rules in the form of policy
directives and guidance documents. (As just indicated, we generally do not address the further delegation
issues that arise with the hierarchical structure within an agency and hence do not focus on the strategic
interactions among multiple regulators within the agency.) The ability of regulators to issue such
informal rules arises in part because of slack in the relationship between the multiple principals
(members of Congress) and the agent (regulators).
A response to this may be that the amount of informal rules observed simply reflects the degree
of monitoring and policing that Congress is willing to undertake. But this is another way to phrase the
common result in sophisticated principal-agent models that the amount of slack is endogenous. Given
divergent preferences between principals and agents, the amount of monitoring and policing, and hence
the amount of slack available for consumption by agents, will depend on the relative benefits of
monitoring and enforcing, the costs of engaging in these operations, and the importance of the issues at
stake. while members of Congress may thus be aware of the possibilities for strategic action by
regulators in the issuance of informal rules, the existence of such rules may indicate the difficulties of
Congress in ensuring compliance with administrative procedures rather than its approval of this informal
method of rulemaking.
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catalogued over 505 OSWER directives that totaled over 19,500 pages of
regulatory "guidance." Nearly half of these directives were issued during 1984-
85, during which time only seven percent of new rules and thirteen percent of
total formal rules were issued. This is inconsistent with the notion that informal
rules are issued simultaneously to elaborate on formal rules and consistent with
a story of informal rules substituting for formal rules. The pattern is also
consistent with informal rules being issued as later additions to formal rules as
these rules are implemented and fought over in the field.
There has been a decline in the number of OSWER directives in recent
years, although the page numbers issued remain substantial. In the late 1980s,
during this decline, the agency began to offer clarifications and elaborations
internally through interpretations made in the form of memos by the RDB of
OSWER. The McCoy and Associates FOIA request yielded over 1200 pages of
these RDB memos. Interpretations of agency positions also increased in the late
1980s with the publication of written responses to questions received by the
agency's RCRA/Superfund Hotline.
Table 5 presents the variable means for the total population and subsamples
of RCRA formal rules. One way to investigate the nature of the informal rules
is to examine the characteristics of the formal rules with which they are cross-
referenced. Comparison of those formal rules that are supplemented by
OSWER directives with those formal rules that are not cross-referenced with
OSWER directives reveals clear differences between the two groups. If one
assumes that the informal rules deal with the same topics as the formal rules
cross-referenced with them, as we have, then one can use these figures to
compare formal rules with informal rules. In our discussion of the agency's
selection of rulemaking procedures, we will often refer to the characteristics of
formal rules that have associated informal rules simply as the characteristics of
"informal rules." Of the 697 formal CFR rules dealing with RCRA, 210 had
associated OSWER directives or guidance memoranda. Table 5 indicates that
rules with OSWER directives are more likely to deal with enforcement issues
and closure actions at hazardous waste facilities than rules without OSWER
directives. About sixteen percent of the rules that are purely formal deal with
enforcement actions, versus thirty-two percent of those rules supplemented by
informal rules. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the agency might
choose to issue informal rules when it wishes to preserve discretion relating to
its own activities, such as inspections at facilities and closure proceedings at
facilities that have reached the end of their commercial viability or are unable
to remain in operation because of failure to meet regulatory standards. Testing
and technical standards provisions are more likely to be issued formally,
consistent with the greater ease of explicating and enforcing these requirements
through clearly enunciated formal rules. Rules relating to containers and tanks
are also more likely to be issued formally, while landfill and incinerator rules are
more likely to be issued informally (in the sense that a higher fraction of rules
with OSWER directives relate to these technologies).
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The degree of congressional and judicial scrutiny is also different for formal
versus informal rules. Comparing rules with OSWER directives to those without
OSWER directives, one finds that informal rules were more likely to have had
a version that was subject to a congressional hammer (16.7% versus 11.7% of
rules without OSWER documents), had been issued under a court deadline
(17.6% versus 6.4%), or had been the subject of a court remand or consent
decree (46.7% versus 11.1%).
These results are consistent with at least three alternative explanations. One
explanation is that the agency may wish to issue controversial rules informally,
and that these measures of congressional and judicial scrutiny simply reflect
underlying controversy. In this scenario, the agency's rulemaking would not
necessarily be a reaction to congressional or judicial action. A second
explanation is that as a response to congressional or court scrutiny the agency
may choose to issue OSWER directives rather than formal rules, because their
application and enforcement is harder to monitor. A third explanation would be
that the congressional and judicial actions are a response to the rules' issuance
as informal OSWER directives. We believe the latter interpretation is the least
likely, for lawsuits surrounding the rules that are mentioned in the preamble to
the formally enunciated rules do not often mention challenges to OSWER
directives. Yet, our data do not distinguish between when the congressional and
judicial actions took place and when the OSWER directives were issued. To the
degree that our data control for other measures of controversy, such as revisions
and costs, then the congressional and judicial action variables can be viewed as
relating to reactions to monitoring by those groups. That informal rules appear
to be more likely when Congress or the courts are involved in rulemaking
establishes necessary, though not sufficient, evidence to prove evasion by the rule
writers.
The informal rules (that is, the formal rules that have informal rules
associated with them) go through more revisions (3.6 versions) than the rules
without OSWER directives (1.8 versions). The formal rules are more likely to
have had a technical correction, consistent with the hypothesis that more
complex or technical provisions are issued formally. Rules with OSWER
directives have a higher number of associated RDB memos (2.6 versus .19) and
a higher number of Hotline responses (1.7 versus .24). This raises the question
of whether to treat RDBs and Hotline responses as informal rules equivalent to
OSWER directives and thus subject to the same generating process within the
agency, or to view these two categories as simply reflecting responses to
questions of interpretation arising from formal rules. Unlike the OSWER
directives, which are often widely circulated and sometimes placed by the agency
with the National Technical Information Service for sale and distribution, the
RDB memos were internal to the agency and released through a FOIA request
(although they are now commercially available from McCoy). The Hotline
responses are contained within agency reports that contain information to help
personnel understand current interpretations.
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Table 5 offers some evidence that OSWER directives, RDBs, and Hotline
responses are different. The most frequent subject of the formal rules
supplemented by OSWERs is enforcement (31.9%), while the most frequent
subject of the RDB rules and the rules involved in Hotline questions are
definitions (59.6% of the RDBs and 34.2% of the Hotline questions). Hotline
and RDB rules are also more likely to be subject to technical corrections, again
indicating that these agency responses may be better characterized as traditional
interpretive rules that clarify technical issues rather than as new rules that
enunciate significant requirements. We will thus focus our examination of
informal rules on the OSWER directives; note that of the full sample of 697
formal rules, 210 had associated OSWER directives, 47 had associated RDBs,
and 149 were the subject of Hotline responses.
Table 6 provides some additional evidence concerning these relationships
among rule types. While the existence of an OSWER directive or RDB memo
and the number of Hotline responses are positively correlated for the formal
RCRA rules, Hotline responses and RDB memos are more strongly correlated
with each other than with OSWER directives. Having an OSWER document
associated with the formal rule is positively and significantly correlated with
judicial scrutiny and with whether the standard is a major rule. Hammers and
congressional deadlines are positively correlated, consistent with the view that
these types of congressional scrutiny are related and may be applied to different
versions of the same rule at various times in its lifetime. Major rules are
positively correlated with court-imposed deadlines and negatively correlated with
court remands, perhaps indicating judicial deference on the content of these
rules, and that these issues are resolved in rulemaking battles rather than in court
battles.
Table 8 allows us to make conclusions about the determinants of agency
selection of formal versus informal rulemaking procedures by examining what
factors influence whether a formal rule is supplemented by at least one informal
rule in the form of an OSWER directive.' The dependent variable in the
64. Before the regression results are examined, one additional question about our model should be
addressed. The discussion about whether the agency chooses to issue an OSWER directive or place all
requirements in a formal CFR rule has focused on a cross-section of characteristics of the formal rule
(e.g., does the rule deal with enforcement? does it apply to tanks? is it a major rule?). Rules also differ,
however, in terms of timing (e.g., when was the formal rule issued? when was the OSWER directive
issued?). Since the agency's policies and objectives that determine its desire to issue formal versus
informal rules may change over time, a question arises about whether the differences that appear to be
due to cross-section characteristics are really due more to circumstances when the rule was issued. More
specifically, Table 4 indicates that nearly half of the OSWER directives issued were published in 1984
and 1985. Is it the case that the agency appeared to be willing to issue directives and guidance memos
more frequently during those two years so that whatever the topics and characteristics of rules issued
during that time period, it is these elements that will appear to be the most important cross-section
factors in driving the agency's decision? In other words, if 1984 happened to be the year when decisions
dealing with characteristic Y came up and the agency was issuing informal rules as a policy during this
time period, will it appear that Y is driving the decision in our analysis? The evidence suggests that this
is not a problem with our cross-sectional analysis.
There are definite time periods of significant activity in RCRA rulemakings: the Phase I core
regulations; Phase II regulations, the remaining core rules (1981-82); and the activities resulting from the
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logistic regression is equal to 1 if the formal rule has an OSWER directive cross-
referenced with it. The versions of the model are presented so that sets of
variables are added representing what the rule requires, which technologies are
covered, what the congressional and legislative interactions have been on the
rule, and how controversial or costly the rule is. The coefficients for the
variables are similar across the different formulations of the model, so we focus
our attention on specification (4), which tests hypotheses relating to all these
factors.
Specification (4) indicates that rules dealing with enforcement actions and
closure provisions for the facility are, holding other factors constant, more likely
to be issued informally than formally relative to rules that provide definitions
(DEFN is the omitted requirements dummy variable here). This is consistent
with the notion that the agency may wish to preserve its discretion in the
interactions and negotiations associated with enforcement actions. Closure
provisions, which deal with a facility's ex ante preparation for shutting down and
ex post compliance with rules when it is closed, may be issued informally again
out of a desire to preserve discretion in dealing with the negotiations surrounding
the closure of a facility. Note that these rules deal with actions by the agency,
in contrast to the other rules which define the actions taken by the facilities.
The statistically significant coefficients on technology variables indicate that
rules dealing with tanks or containers are more likely to be issued formally, that
is in rules published in the CFR that are not supplemented by OSWER
documents. Rules covering landfills, however, are more likely to be issued
informally. Table 3 provides information on the number of facilities and amount
Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments ("HSWA") of 1984, including the codification of 25 statutory
provisions of HSWA in July 1985 and the issuance of numerous directives and guidance documents
dealing with these amendments. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, EPA ACTIvrrIEs AND
ACCOMPLISHMENTS UNDER THE RESOURCE CONSERVATION AND RECOVERY ACT: FISCAL YEARS 1980
TO 1985 (1986). Nearly half of all OSWER directives and guidance manuals were issued during 1984-85
(although this accounts for only 23% of the total pages of these types of informal rules). However, a
close examination of the informal rules issued during this period indicates that a wide variety of types
of OSWERs were issued. For Table 7, each time an OSWER directive was cross-referenced with a
formal CFR rule in the McCoy index, the characteristics of the formal rule (e.g., did it deal with tanks?)
were used to categorize the requirements of the directive or guidance document. There are a total of 961
such pairings of formal CFR rules and OSWER directive requirements. Table 7 shows the distribution
of these requirements by category type (note that a single OSWER directive may be counted more than
once here if it was linked to more than one CFR rule or if the CFR rule with which it was linked dealt
with multiple categories of rules). The figures indicate that it is generally not the case that a larger than
average fraction of one category of rules had OSWER directives concentrated in 1984-85; rather, most
categories of rules had some directives issued during that period. This helps alleviate problems that
would arise if a higher than average fraction of a rule type was concentrated in this time period, and this
rule characteristic appeared to be a driving factor in the selection of formal versus informal requirements.
As an additional check, we examined the correlation between the rule characteristics and the year
the OSWER directive was issued for the set of 961 CFR-OSWER directive pairings. Though the date
the OSWER directive was published and some rule characteristics were slightly correlated, the
relationship between when an OSWER was issued and what type of rule was involved was generally
weak. Any relationships between the characteristics of the formal rules and whether these rules are
supplemented by OSWER directives are due to the types of cross-section hypotheses discussed above
rather than a coincidence between a policy of informality adopted by the agency and the concentration
of rules of a certain type during the 1984-85 period.
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of waste streams handled by the technologies.' Tanks and containers are part
of management methods at many facilities that handle large waste streams. For
example, RCRA-permitted storage, which may involve these two technologies,
accounted for 189 million tons of waste (nearly a quarter of waste handling in
1986) and was spread over nearly 1800 facilities. In contrast, landfill technology
was restricted to 118 facilities, which managed 3.17 million tons with this
technology. The pattern of formal rules for tanks and containers and informal
ones for landfills is consistent with the hypothesis that the agency will prefer
formal rules when a large number of facilities are involved, because informal
rules here might entail numerous regulatory interactions and negotiations for
clarification and enforcement. When a smaller number of facilities is involved,
however, the agency may prefer to preserve its discretion through informal rules
and conduct negotiations over rule provisions with the facilities. The controver-
sies associated with potential groundwater contamination also are consistent with
a desire by the agency to use informal rulemaking with landfill regulations,
although the direction of the agency's actions here in terms of stringency are not
clear. Informality may allow the agency to write stricter landfill standards than
those attainable through the notice-and-comment process, or it may allow
regulators to write laxer standards than in a formal forum subject to participation
and monitoring by environmental groups.
Those rules that are the subject of court remand or consent decrees are more
likely to be issued informally. As outlined above, this may mean that increased
judicial scrutiny leads to attempts by the agency to circumvent the courts'
directives by using informal rules or that informal rules are issued on controver-
sial issues in general and that these types of issues often end in adjudication.
Note that court remands are positive and statistically significant even after we
control for other measures of controversy, such as the number of revisions.
Hammer provisions and court deadlines are also positively related to the
selection of informal rules in specification (3), although they are not statistically
significant in specification (4) once additional controversy measures are added.
Major rules, which are requirements that impose large costs, and rules that
have been revised frequently are also more likely to be supplemented with
OSWER directives. This is consistent with the hypothesis that the agency will
attempt to impose more costly or controversial requirements through informal
rules because they may be unable to achieve similar rules through the notice-
and-comment process (or may only be able to achieve such rules in the notice-
and-comment process at a larger political price). Time dummies indicating when
the CFR rule was issued were added in specification (5) to see if there is a trend
in the issuance of informal rules. Time dummy variables for new formal rules
issued in 1988, 1989, and 1990-91 were all negative and statistically significant,
indicating that these formal rules were less likely to have informal rules
65. See infra page 151. R.D. Baker et al., Management of Hazerdous Waste in the United States, 9
HAZARDOUS WASTE & HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 1 (1992).
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associated with them. This may be because the agency has shifted away from
informal rules like the OSWER directives, or because it takes time for formal
rules to be supplemented by informal rules (so we have not observed the
additions to come for these rules) or because there is a life cycle in a regulatory
program such that the controversial RCRA rules (supplemented by informal
rules) have been issued earlier on and the formal rules in the later stages of the
program are more clarifying than controversial. A revision of RCRA legislation,
however, could start another new cycle of informal rules.
Table 9 focuses on a different question: for those rules which are supple-
mented by informal rules, what factors influence the length of the OSWER
documents? The regression sample here is the 210 formal decimal point CFR
rules that are cross-referenced with OSWER directives, with the dependent
variable being the number of pages of policy memos, guidance manuals, and
directives associated with the formal rule. Again, the signs and statistical
significance of the variables are similar across the different specifications of the
model, so we focus on specification (4), the fullest specification. Those rules that
require the facility to provide new information, those associated with technology
standards requiring expenditures on human or physical capital, and those relating
to cleanups at contaminated hazardous waste facilities (for example, RCRA
corrective actions) are likely to be longer rules. The details involved in
technology standards and descriptions of cleanup standards and technologies thus
make the informal rules associated with these requirements longer. Rules
covering technologies that are subject to failures such as groundwater contamina-
tion, including waste piles, surface impoundments, and landfills, are also
substantially longer. Finally, those rules that have been the subject of court
remands are also likely to be associated with more pages of OSWER directives,
consistent with the hypothesis that the agency attempts to circumvent judicial
action by issuing more informal requirements.
Table 10 provides additional evidence for the assessment that the Hotline
responses are not generated by the same agency process as the informal rules
such as the OSWER directives. The results in specification (4) are consistent
with an interpretation of the Hotline responses as representing agency answers
to frequently-asked questions from the regulated community. In terms of types
of rules, nearly all types of rules are less likely to generate questions than the
omitted rule classification-rules setting forth definitions. Rules relating to
generators are more likely to be associated with Hotline responses, which may
be explained in part by the large number of facilities that are generators
regulated under RCRA. More costly rules, denoted by the major rule variable,
are also more likely to generate questions answered through the Hotline. An
additional variable included in this specification indicates whether there are
OSWER documents associated with the formal rule. The positive and
statistically significant coefficient may indicate that the underlying variables that
lead to the issuance of the OSWER document may also lead to Hotline
questions. Yet since we have attempted to control for these in the regression,
the result can also be interpreted as indicating that CFR regulations with
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informal rules are associated with more questions from the regulated community.
One complaint about informal rules from the regulated community is that they
create uncertain property rights and are more difficult to understand; the positive
association between OSWER documents and Hotline questions may reflect the
uncertainty associated with informal rules.
The data collected for the analysis of rulemaking also allow us to make some
observations about the determinants of court remands. Note that we lack
information on the timing of the actions taken by Congress and the courts and
when the OSWER documents were issued, and that our variables code whether
any version of a rule was subject to a particular type of scrutiny. Thus, we
cannot know with certainty for a formal rule that has both a hammer provision
and court remand whether the hammer provision came before the court remand
or whether the court remand pre-dated the version of the rule that was later the
subject of the hammer provision. Yet, assuming that congressional action pre-
dates the agency or court actions here, we can derive some lessons from the
logistic analysis in Table 11 of what types of rules are the subject of court
remands and consent decrees.
In terms of types of rules, requirements relating to testing and technical
standards relating to human and physical capital were less likely to be the subject
of court remands, perhaps indicating either a willingness by courts to let agency
actions stand in this area or a lower frequency of challenge. In areas where the
agency may attempt to exercise more discretion in terms of its actions, such as
enforcement actions and closure requirements, court remands were more likely.
Rules with hammer provisions were less likely to be remanded by the courts or
to be the subject of consent decrees, which would be consistent with courts'
willingness to let these provisions stand because of congressional specificity or
because of a lower frequency of challenge. Rules that were revised often, an
indicator of controversy, were also more likely to be the subject of remand,
while, other things being equal, rules imposing larger costs were less likely. This
may be because formal rules designated as major because of their costs are
shown deference by courts willing to accept agency decisions on these rules,
which have undergone extensive examination (a regulatory impact analysis)
during the rulemaking stage. Finally, those rules with associated informal rules
in the form of OSWER documents were more likely to be the subject of court
remands, which may indicate that attempts to apply informal rules or exercise
agency discretion beyond that provided for in formal standards may lead to court
remands or consent decrees.
IV
CONCLUSION
Previous models of the political economy of administrative law have focused
on how the requirements of formal rulemaking, such as the notice-and-comment
process, serve as a constraint on agency behavior. Congress is viewed as using
the design of the rulemaking environment to facilitate channeling and monitor-
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ing, allowing interest groups to shape the final rules that emerge, and to alert
members of Congress to agency actions that may require oversight and reversal.
This article argues that regulators should also be viewed as strategic in choosing
administrative processes. More precisely, we assert that an agency desiring to
issue a rule faces decisions about both the content of the rule and the format of
its enunciation. We have termed "informal rules" those rules that are issued
outside of the traditional APA paradigm of Federal Register notice-and-comment
procedure.
The existence of informal rules at first may appear unlikely, for why would
regulated parties adhere to rules that might easily be challenged as having been
adopted improperly? In an arena where procedural challenges often mark
broader struggles over substantive policy differences, why would environmental-
ists or industry participants allow informal rules to go unchallenged? We believe
part of the answer lies in the fact that in a program such as the regulation of
hazardous waste under RCRA, the process of negotiations that surrounds the
permitting process and the prospect of multiple future interactions between
regulators and permit holders means that the informal rules may be used to
establish agency bargaining positions. The regulated parties technically might
not have to meet all the requirements in these rules, and, in fact, one reason the
EPA may prefer informality is that it allows regulators leeway, too. Still, the
discretion embodied in the permitting process may provide the regulators with
leverage to secure adherence to rules that have not been formally promulgated.
Thus, while some parties may challenge these rules, and our data provides some
evidence that rules that have informal components are more likely to be the
subject of court remands, these informal rules do provide the agency with a way
to promote requirements without using the "political market" to secure
agreement on formal rules.
An alternative explanation for the over 19,500 pages of OSWER documents
is that they are simply clarifications that spell out the requirements of the
formally published rules. If this were the case, however, there would be few
differences between those CFR rules with and without OSWER documents,
except perhaps in terms of which rules were more technical and thus required
elaboration. We have presented hypotheses about why the agency may
strategically choose to issue requirements informally and tested these with data
from the rules implementing RCRA. Our results are consistent with a strategic
agency that chooses informality when it wishes to provide for greater discretion
in agency actions, to establish rules that entail major costs, to promote standards
that involve controversy, to provide for individual negotiations over issues that
involve smaller numbers of facilities, and to avoid congressional and judicial
scrutiny and constraints as signaled by actions such as court remands.
Informality thus offers a means for regulators to evade both the constraints
imposed by Congress and the courts and the executive branch oversight exercised
by OMB. We do not claim that these informal rules go unnoticed by the
legislative and judicial branches, just as slack does not go unnoticed in general
principal-agent relationships. Rather, courts and Congress must weigh the costs
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of monitoring and punishing agencies against the costs posed by agency
discretion embodied in informal rules. This view does not mean that the ability
to issue informal rules frees agencies from congressional constraints. It means
rather that just as members of Congress face strategic decisions about the form
of administrative procedures, regulators face strategic decisions about the degree
to which they comply with the formal requirements of rulemaking in establishing
the "rules" that define property rights for the regulated community.
























Requires provision of existing information
Requires provision of new information
Requires testing or monitoring at the site
Requires expenditure on specific physical or human capital
Relates to enforcement actions or inspections
Relates to financial requirements
Deals with closure or post-closure issues
Deals with corrective action (i.e. cleanup) provisions
Establishes applicability requirement (i.e. defines words or the scope of
coverage)
Specific Technologies: Variable = I if the rule covers the specific technology of
Containers CONTAIN Container storage
Tanks TANK Tanks
Piles PILE Waste piles
Impoundments SURIM Surface impoundments
Incinerators INCIN Incinerators
Landfills LNDFILL Landfills
Land Treatment LNDTRT Land treatment
Other Technology MISC Other technologies, including drip pads




















HAMT Congress set a deadline with a fallback position if the agency did not act
DEADT Congress set a deadline for rule issuance but did not specify a fallback
position
CRTIMPT Courts imposed a deadline for rule issuance
CRTREMT Courts remanded a rule to the agency or the version of the rule arose from
court actions (including consent decrees)













Number of revisions to the rule that were technical corrections
Total number of revisions to the rule
= I if the rule applies specifically to waste generators
= I if rule applies specifically to commercial waste handling facilities
= I if there are OSWER directives relating to this rule
Number of OSWER directives
Number of pages of OSWER directives
= 1 if there are RDB memos relating to this rule
Number of RDB memos
Number of pages of RDB memos
= 1 if there are Hotline responses relating to this rule
Total number of Hotline responses
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TABLE 2
ExPECTED COEMCM-NT SIGNS IN THE MODEL PREDICTING WHETHER OSWER
DIRECrIVES SUPPLEMENT A FoRMA. RULE
Hypotheses
Transaction Political Regulatory Application/ Congressional Judicial






Enforcement + + + +
Financial +
Closure + + + +







Incinerators + + +








Major Rule + + +
Other Variables
Technical Corrections
Total Versions + +
Generators
Commercial Facilities + +
Note: A + indicates that for a given hypothesis a formal rule will be more likely to be supplemented by an OSWER
directive, while a - indicates it will be less likely to be supplemented by an OSWER directive.
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TABLE 3
HAZARDOus WASTE MANAGEMENT TEcmoLoioEs
Quantity Managed in 1986
Management Method (Million Tons) Number of Facilities
Metal Recovery 1.44 330
Solvent recovery 1.18 1470
Other recycling 0.96 243
Fuel blending 0.75 177
Reuse as fuel 1.44 295
Incineration 1.09 197
Solidification 0.77 122
Land treatment 0.38 58
Wastewater treatment 732.00 4399
Disposal impoundment 4.61 70
Surface impoundment 232.00 298
Landfill 3.17 118
Waste pile 0.68 71
Underground injection 28.7 63
Storage (RCRA permitted) 189.00 1785
Other treatment 1.98 128
Note: Quantities reported were obtained using the 1986 EPA TSDR survey. Total waste generated in 1986 was 747
million tons; note that some wastes were managed in multiple treatment technologies and that wastes can be sent to and
removed from storage. Disposal impoundments are surface impoundments used for disposing of hazardous waste.
Surface impoundment figures include waste entering surface impoundments for disposal, treatment, and storage.
Source: This table is reproduced from Baker et.al., 1992.
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TABLE 4
NUMBER OF RULE ENUNCIATIONS PER YEAR, By TYPE OF RULE
New Formal Rules Total Formal Rules
Year Number Percent Number Percent
1980 153 22.0 175 10.7
1981 30 4.3 53 3.2
1982 72 10.3 109 6.7
1983 75 10.8 150 9.2
1984 3 .4 21 1.3
1985 44 6.3 196 12.0
1986 80 11.5 211 12.9
1987 12 1.7 85 5.2
1988 107 15.4 190 11.6
1989 19 2.7 94 5.8
1990 74 10.6 185 11.3
1991 28 4.0 165 10.1
Total: 697 1634
OSWER Directives OSWER Directive Page Totals
Year Number Percent Number Percent
1980 20 4.0 99 .51
1981 17 3.4 586 3.00
1982 26 5.1 1542 7.89
1983 36 7.1 1372 7.02
1984 124 24.6 2201 11.27
1985 121 24.0 2336 11.96
1986 69 13.7 4850 24.83
1987 32 6.3 805 4.12
1988 28 5.5 1850 9.47
1989 16 3.2 1958 10.02
1990 11 2.2 1383 7.08
1991 5 1.0 554 2.84
Total: 505 19,536
RDB Memos RDB Page Totals
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TABLE 5
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TABLE 6
CORRELATIONS OF SELECTED REGRESSION VARLABLES
Hammer Deadline Court Deadline Court Remand
Hammer
Deadline 0.208*
Court Deadline 0.057 0.003
Court Remand -0.042 0.008 -0.010
Major Rule 0.377* 0.001 0.467* -0.101*
OSWERs 0.067 0.020 0.174* 0.395*
RDBs 0.250* 0.005 -0.011 0.014
Total Hotline Responses 0.282* 0.215* 0.089** 0.132*
Total Hotline
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Note: The unit of analysis is the regulatory requirement in an OSWER directive, obtained by matching each OSWER
directive with the characteristics of the CFR rule(s) associated with it. Counts represent the number of OSWER
requirements issued in a given year associated with the particular category, based on counts of the characteristics of the
CFR rules matched with the OSWER directives. A single OSWER directive may be counted in more than one category
if it deals with multiple categories or is referenced by more than one CFR rule. There are a total of 961 pairings of
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TABLE 8
DETERmINANTs OF INFORMAL RuLEMAKING: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS PREDICTING
WHETHER OSWER DOcuMENTs SUPPLEMENT THE FORMAL RULE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
estimate S.E. estimate S.E. estimate S.E. estimate S.E. estimate S.E.
Intercept -1.044 (0.175) -0.992 (0.192) -1.777 (0.238) -2.237 (0.271) -1.876 (0.318)
Existing Information 0.005 (0.406) -0.102 (0.415) -0.107 (0.456) -0.028 (0.469) -0.139 (0.475)
New Information 0.104 (0.203) 0.092 (0.210) 0.099 (0.225) 0.137 (0.233) 0.161 (0.244)
Testing -0.209 (0.314) -0.177 (0.323) 0.011 (0.357) 0.039 (0.367) 0.321 (0.414)
Technical Standards -0.369** (0.220) -0.421** (0.231) -0.247 (0.248) -0.081 (0.254) 0.158 (0.271)
Financial -0.305 (0.377) 0.039 (0.411) 0.115 (0.451) -0.171 (0.451) -0.632 (0.584)
Enforcement 0.839* (0.217) 0.859* (0.228) 0.771* (0.253) 0.921* (0.264) 0.950* (0.304)
Closure 1.394* (0.300) 1.425* (0.314) 0.981* (0.346) 1.137* (0.347) 1.310* (0.375)
Corrective Action -0.465 (0.808) 0.187 (0.839) 0.391 (0.867) -0.030 (0.869) -0.026 (0.890)
Containers -1.209** (0.671) -1.242** (0.728) -1.266** (0.745) -1.411"* (0.746)
Tanks -0.924* (0.307) -0.400 (0.339) -0.726* (0.370) -0.114 (0.558)
Piles 0.198 (0.560) 0.109 (0.593) 0.118 (0.614) -0.390 (0.622)
Impoundments 0.310 (0.511) 0.186 (0.554) 0.160 (0.578) -0.342 (0.571)
Incinerators 0.726 (0.531) 0.773 (0.568) 0.467 (0.563) 0.483 (0.687)
Landfills 1.369* (0.478) 1.135* (0.525) 1.201* (0.538) 0.815 (0.555)
Land Treatment 0.393 (0.479) -0.233 (0.563) -0.174 (0.574) -0.542 (0.564)
Other Technologies 2.094* (1.058) -1.581 (1.080) -1.406 (1.086) -0.929 (1.310)
Generators 0.210 (0.388) 0.374 (0.418) 0.339 (0.439) 0.206 (0.466)
Deadline 0.525 (0.355) 0.419 (0.392) 0.250 (0.476)
Hammer 0.482** (0.285) -0.495 (0.371) -0.233 (0.408)
Court Deadline 1.350* (0.355) 0.363 (0.421) -0.208 (0.565)
Court Remand 1.674* (0.228) 1.625* (0.243) 1.075* (0.311)
Total Versions 0.129* (0.052) 0.141* (0.057)











Log likelihood -402.4 -386.0 -344.9 -330.9 -309.1
Number of
Observations 697 697 697 697 697
* = statistically significant at 5% level; ** = statistically significant at the 10% level.
Note: Sample consists of formal rules implementing RCRA. Dependent variable in logit equals 1 if there are informal
rules in the form of OSWER documents associated with the rule. Standard errors are in parentheses. Year variables
are time dummies indicating the initial year the formal rule was issued.
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TABLE 9
DETERMINANTS OF LENGTH OF INFORMAL RULES: OLS REGRESSIONS PREDICTING
NUMBER OF OSWER DocuMENT PAGES FOR FORMAL RULES SUPPLEMENTED BY
OSWER DIRECrvEs
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
estimate S.E. estimate S.E. estimate S.E. estimate S.E.
Intercept 48.31 (60.72) 53.2 (64.19) -33.21 (77.99) -71.52 (84.33)
Existing Information -81.58 (141.53) -47.11 (139.11) -68.60 (139.06) -61.48 (139.95)
New Information 141.82* (67.95) 148.69* (67.81) 136.17* (68.90) 140.19* (69.13)
Testing 9.20 (118.64) -70.11 (118.97) -85.57 (119.94) -69.66 (120.93)
Technical Standards 216.59* (79.02) 165.81* (81.89) 178.67* (83.35) 188.95* (84.30)
Financial 163.99 (134.55) 195.68 (134.41) 200.38 (134.91) 191.12 (136.58)
Enforcement 112.85 (71.94) 102.31 (73.66) 88.53 (77.75) 95.53 (78.10)
Closure -19.46 (90.76) -84.91 (90.57) -122.09 (93.32) -95.83 (95.87)
Corrective Action 652.78* (308.79) 644.45* (301.19) 703.44* (302.42) 685.91* (305.14)
Containers -187.86 (258.81) -216.08 (257.13) -226.94 (257.64)
Tanks -82.71 (110.63) -64.6 (122.38) -47.85 (123.91)
Piles 407.54* (177.82) 439.0* (184.61) 422.98* (188.61)
Impoundments 447.00* (163.88) 472.31* (164.69) 457.39* (166.88)
Incinerators -71.56 (156.57) -81.76 (156.36) -72.37 (158.17)
Landfills 233.18** (136.94) 256.16** (146.21) 261.65** (147.57)
Land Treatment 79.11 (154.24) 91.37 (160.56) 101.53 (161.79)
Other Technologies -31.2 (422.29) 55.21 (420.12) 84.75 (421.55)
Generators -177.80 (129.76) -160.57 (130.14) -165.11 (130.36)
Deadline 151.29 (111.12) 113.92 (120.98)
Hammer -0.5 (90.26) -70.03 (107.24)
Court Deadline 67.36 (93.76) 6.21 (106.91)
Court Remand 137.99* (66.80) 126.77* (68.98)
Total Versions 8.77 (9.46)
Major Rule 62.49 (81.56)
Adj. R2  .04 .08 .10 .10
Number of
Observations 210 210 210 210
* = statistically significant at 5% level; ** = statistically significant at the 10% level.
Note: Sample consists of formal rules implementing RCRA which had OSWER directives associated with them.
Dependent variable in OLS regression is the number of pages of OSWER documents associated with the rule.
Standard errors are in parentheses.
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TABLE 10
DETERMiNANTs OF HoTLnE RESPONSES: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS PREDICTING
WHETHER THE RULE WAS COVERED BY A HOTLIN RESPONSE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Parameter Parameter Parameter Parameter
estimate S.E. estimate S.E. estimate S.E. estimate S.E.
Intercept -0.738 (0.178) -0.807 (0.196) -1.581 (0.241) -2.253 (0.288)
Existing Information -0.409 (0.434) -0.475 (0.443) -0.226 (0.466) -0.116 (0.492)
New Information -0.525* (0.237) -0.576* (0.243) -0.552* (0.255) -0.628* (0.279)
Testing -0.722* (0.357) -0.672** (0.362) -0.370 (0.381) -0.440 (0.423)
Technical Standards -0.817* (0.239) -0.794* (0.246) -0.746* (0.263) -0.696* (0.289)
Financial -0.501 (0.401) -0.648 (0.420) -0.528 (0.436) -0.760** (0.451)
Enforcement -0.773* (0.271) -0.712" (0.278) -0.720* (0.299) -1.080* (0.335)
Closure 0.820* (0.309) 0.908* (0.315) 1.001* (0.335) 0.854* (0.361)
Corrective Action -0.490 (0.810) -0.724 (0.834) -0.517 (0.841) -0.869 (0.861)
Containers -0.314 (0.589) -0.118 (0.649) 0.370 (0.709)
Tanks 0.370 (0.272) 0.951 * (0.305) 0.900* (0.350)
Piles -0.405 (0.679) -0.445 (0.727) -0.594 (0.782)
Impoundments 0.117 (0.551) -0.067 (0.602) -0.215 (0.647)
Incinerators -0.527 (0.780) -0.158 (0.786) -0.374 (0.808)
Landfills 0.543 (0.496) 0.157 (0.572) -0.301 (0.628)
Land Treatment -1.822** (1.049) -2.236* (1.103) -2.290* (1.154)
Generators 0.670** (0.382) 0.832* (0.408) 0.814** (0.466)
Deadline 0.199 (0.321) 0.206 (0.374)
Hammer 1.633* (0.277) 1.131* (0.358)
Court Deadline 0.957* (0.384) -0.182 (0.450)
Court Remand 0.744* (0.256) 0.078 (0.296)
Total Versions 0.037 (0.029)
Major Rule 0.823* (0.293)
OSWERs 1.924* (0.259)
Log likelihood -347.8 -341.6 -314.9 -274.2
Number of
Observations 697 697 697 697
* = statistically significant at 5% level; ** = statistically significant at the 10% level.
Note: Sample consists of formal rules implementing RCRA. Dependent variable in logit equals 1 if there is at least 1
Hotline response covering the formal rule.
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TABLE 11
DETERMINANTS OF COURT REMANDS: LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS PREDICTING WHETHER































-1.695 (0.202) -1.423 (0.214) -1.438 (0.228) -2.151 (0.276)
0.454 (0.432) 0.399 (0.437) 0.391 (0.440) 0.364 (0.496)
0.318 (0.226) 0.250 (0.234) 0.235 (0.235) 0.308 (0.253)
-0.775** (0.468) -0.893** (0.476) -0.979* (0.479) -0.964* (0.497)
-0.693* (0.278) -0.703* (0.289) -0.743 * (0.290) -0.586** (0.313)
-0.071 (0.403) 0.334 (0.473) 0.409 (0.481) 0.065 (0.550)
1.226* (0.235) 1.101* (0.244) 1.170* (0.249) 0.980* (0.273)
1.857* (0.312) 1.932* (0.336) 1.893* (0.341) 1.611* (0.374)
-0.562 (0.792) -0.483 (0.798) -0.047 (0.797)
-i.936* (0.457) -2.135* (0.467) -1.720* (0.512)
-1.514 (1.090) -1.453 (1.094) -1.515 (1.157)
-0.841 (0.804) -0.783 (0.807) -0.855 (0.890)
0.887 (0.563) 0.915 (0.569) 0.560 (0.644)
-0.874 (0.803) -0.789 (0.809) -1.094 (0.866)
-0.287 (0.613) -0.232 (0.620) -0.232 (0.722)
0.180 (0.425) 0.259 (0.428) 0.232 (0.453)
0.916* (0.367) 0.556 (0.415)












* = statistically significant at 5% level; ** = statistically significant at the 10% level.
Note: Sample consists of formal rules implementing RCRA. Dependent variable in logit equals 1 if the courts
remanded the rule to the agency or the version of the rule arose from court actions (including consent decrees).
Standard errors are in parentheses.
